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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LMV LEASING, INC., 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
ROY W. MALLORY, VAL CONLIN, 
BARBARA CONLIN, TUBBER T. 
OKUDA, MARY Y. OKUDA, 
Defendants/Appellants 
TUBBER K. OKUDA, MARY Y. 
OKUDA, VAL J. CONLIN, and 
BARBARA CONLIN, 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
MAUREEN MALLORY, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
Case No. 890504-CA 
No. 14b 
INTRODUCTION 
This case arises out of a lease agreement between LMV Leasing, 
Inc. (hereafter "LMV", "Plaintiff" or the "Lessor") and the lessee, 
M.C.O., Inc., (hereafter "MCO") which was personally guaranteed by 
each of the defendants, Roy W. Mallory, Val Conlin, Barbara Conlin, 
Tubber T. Okuda, and Mary Y. Okuda. MCO, Inc., was not made a 
defendant in this case because of the automatic stay arising from 
its filing for bankruptcy. Roy W. Mallory is not a party to this 
appeal as a result of Malloryfs filing for bankruptcy relief. 
Defendants Val Conlin, Barbara Conlin, Tubber T. Okuda, and Mary 
Y. Okuda (hereafter collectively referred to as "Defendants") 
appeal the summary judgment obtained against them. 
JURISDICTION 
Respondent's brief is filed in response to the appeal taken 
to the Utah Supreme Court by Defendants Conlins and Okudas pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j ) (Supp. 1989). The Utah Supreme 
Court subsequently assigned this appeal to the Utah Court of 
Appeals under Rule 4A, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. The trial 
court certified this case for appeal under Rule 54(b), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, leaving only the third-party complaint against 
Maureen Mallory for later disposition. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendants appeal a summary judgment granted against them as 
guarantors of a lease contract in default. LMV, a Pennsylvania 
corporation, as Lessor, originally signed a lease agreement with 
MCO, a Utah corporation, doing business as American International 
Rent-A-Car, in order to provide MCO with a fleet of cars for its 
business. The lease contract was personally guaranteed by each of 
the Defendants. MCO defaulted in its lease payments and, a few 
months later, after notice to all parties, LMV repossessed and sold 
the cars. LMV then initiated this action to recover as damages the 
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amount due under the lease less interest of six (6) percent and 
less the net proceeds from the car sales, 
LMV prevailed on a Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue 
of liability. The Court directed the parties by telephone 
conference to submit the issue of damages by affidavit. Both 
parties submitted affidavits without comment or objection as to 
form of disposition. Defendants' motion to strike LMV's affidavit 
concerning attorney fees was denied. The trial court thereafter 
awarded LMV damages and attorney fees and certified the judgment 
for appeal pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The only issue remaining in the trial court involves the third-
party complaint against Maureen Mallory. 
LMV contends that the issue of liability is clear in this case 
-- that regardless of whether the agreement is termed a true lease 
or a security agreement, the guarantors are liable for payment of 
the remaining lease payments. The remaining issues, LMV contends, 
all go to the issue of damages and mitigation of damages, including 
such issues as whether the cars were sold in a commercially 
reasonable manner, whether there was impairment of the collateral, 
and whether there were any remaining material factual issues as to 
mitigation of damages. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
IS IT NECESSARY TO DECIDE WHETHER THE TRANSACTION WAS A 
LEASE OR A SECURITY AGREEMENT IN ORDER TO DETERMINE 
WHETHER THE DEFENDANTS ARE LIABLE AS PERSONAL GUARANTORS? 
DID THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DECIDE UNDER THE AFFIDAVITS 
PRESENTED BEFORE IT THAT THE VEHICLES HAD BEEN SOLD IN 
A COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE MANNER PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 70A-9-504(3)? 
DID THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DECIDE ACCORDING TO THE 
AFFIDAVITS PRESENTED BEFORE IT THAT THE VEHICLES HAD BEEN 
SOLD IN A COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE MANNER PURSUANT TO THE 
LEASE? 
DID THE DEFENDANTS PROPERLY RAISE BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT 
THE ISSUE OF IMPAIRMENT OF COLLATERAL? 
DID THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY AWARD DAMAGES AFTER 
REVIEWING THE PARTIES' AFFIDAVITS AS TO MITIGATION OF 
DAMAGES? 
ARE THE DEFENDANTS PROCEDURALLY BARRED FROM RAISING THEIR 
OBJECTION TO DECIDING THE QUESTION OF DAMAGES AND 
ATTORNEY FEES BY MEMORANDA AND AFFIDAVITS BY THEIR 
FAILURE TO RAISE THIS OBJECTION WITH THE TRIAL COURT? 
DID THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENY THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
TO STRIKE THE PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY'S AFFIDAVIT AS TO 
ATTORNEY FEES? 
4 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-20K26), (38) (1981). 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-50M1), (3) (1981). 
3. Utah Code. Ann. § 70A-9-504(3) (1981). 
4. Utah Code. Ann. § 70A-9-507(2) (1981). 
5. Utah Code. Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp, 1989). 
6. Rule 4A, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
7. Rule 4-501(5), Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
8. Rule 4-505(1), Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
9. Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
10. Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: 
This case involves a deficiency action filed against the 
Defendants as personal guarantors of a lease contract. (Record, at 
13). The primary obligor under the contract, MCO, defaulted in the 
agreed payment under the contract, and the Defendants failed to pay 
any of the remaining lease payments. (Record, at 251-54). 
Defendants appeal the trial court1s grant of summary judgment 
on the issue of liability because, they argue, whether the 
agreement was a lease or a security arrangement is a disputed 
material fact. LMV responds that whether the agreement was a lease 
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or a security agreement is immaterial because the suit concerns 
guarantor liability only and all other issues go to damages and 
mitigation of damages. LMV asserts that, whether or not the Utah 
U.C.C. governs this case, a duty to conduct a commercially 
reasonable sale existed because that duty was explicitly provided 
in the lease contract. (Record, at 23, para. 19). Furthermore, LMV 
asserts that it conducted the sale of the vehicles in a 
commercially reasonable manner after giving adequate notice to 
Defendants. LMV denies that any impairment of the collateral 
occurred. 
LMV further asserts that the trial court correctly ruled that 
there remained no material issue of fact precluding judgment as a 
matter of law on the issue of damages. Plaintiff also asserts that 
the Defendants waived all rights to object to the trial court's 
decision by affidavit because the Defendants failed to raise their 
objection with the court below. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition: 
The trial court granted the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the issue of liability. (Record, at 514-15). The Court 
then requested the parties to submit memoranda and affidavits on 
the issue of damages. (Record, at 515-16). The record contains 
no indication of Defendants' objection to this procedure. 
Defendants did object to the Plaintiff's affidavit regarding 
attorneys'' fees and moved to strike that affidavit. (Record, at 
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531). The trial court denied the Defendants' Motion to Strike and 
awarded the Plaintiff attorneys' fees and damages representing the 
remaining unpaid lease payments less six (6) percent interest and 
less the net proceeds from the sale of the cars. (Record, at 550-
51). The trial court did not award LMV liquidated damages as 
provided in the contract. (Record, at 538, 540). 
Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented: 
Val Conlin, President of MCO, entered into an agreement with 
LMV, as Lessor, to have LMV lease to MCO motor vehicles to be 
rented to MCO's car rental customers. (Record, at 13). The 
agreement was formalized in a lease contract entitled The Preferred 
Vehicle Lease Agreement (hereafter the "Lease") on December 29, 
1986. (Exhibit F; Record, at 13-31). In compliance with the Lease, 
the Lessor delivered to MCO fourteen (14) motor vehicles. (Record, 
at 324). Section 4 of the Lease provided that MCO would make 
monthly lease payments to LMV as rent for each of the motor 
vehicles. (Record, at 15). Section 4.1 of the Lease stated that 
a late charge would be assessed to MCO for late or missed payments 
equal to two percent (2%) per month of the lease payment amount 
past due. (Record, at 15). The Lease further stated that MCO was 
responsible for payment of titling, registration, licensing, and 
all inspections of the motor vehicles leased from LMV (Record, at 
17, para. 7); that in the event of default by MCO in payment of the 
monthly rental amount LMV could declare all unpaid future rentals 
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immediately due and payable (Record, at 22, para. 18.1); that MCO 
agreed to pay for any and all expenses LMV incurred in exercising 
its remedies and rights as outlined under the Lease, including 
attorneys' fees, legal expenses, and court costs incurred in 
collecting all amounts due under the Lease. (Exhibit G; Record, at 
23, para. 18.2). 
On January 26, 1987, Defendants Val and Barbara Conlin, in 
their individual capacities, executed an unconditional and 
irrevocable guarantee of payment, in which they agreed to guarantee 
the performance and prompt payment of all sums and other 
obligations of MCO which had become due or which thereafter would 
become du€> to LMV, which sums included all titling fees and 
liquidated damages due to LMV by MCO pursuant to MCO's default 
under the terms of the Lease. (Exihbit G; Record, at 111). On 
February 11, 1987, Defendants Tubber and Mary Okuda, in their 
individual capacities, executed an unconditional and irrevocable 
guarantee of payment, the provisions of which were identical to the 
guarantee document signed by the Conlins. (Exhibit H; Record, at 
113). 
MCO defaulted under the terms of the Lease by failing to make 
any monthly payments to LMV after September 1987. (Record, at 325; 
Defendants1 Brief, at 10). On January 26, 1988, LMV's Pennsylvania 
counsel notified the Defendants Conlin and the Defendants Okuda by 
mailing a notice to the said Defendants' last known address and 
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notifying them that MCO was in default under the terms of the Lease 
with LMV. (Record, at 112, 114). All Defendants in this action 
failed to respond to the notice sent by LMV. (Record, at 253). 
Pursuant to the explicit remedies of LMV under the Lease, LMV 
repossessed the vehicles in March of 1988 and placed those vehicles 
with Nate Wade Subaru, a local new and used car dealer, to be sold 
for LMV. (Record, at 325; Defendants1 Brief, at 10). Mr. Edward 
McCracken, an agent of LMV, mailed a Notice of Sale by certified 
mail, and by regular mail, to each of the Defendants and to MCO on 
April 4, 1988, to notify them that the motor vehicles would be 
sold. (Record, at 325). The Notice of Sale indicated that MCO had 
defaulted under the Lease, that LMV would sell the vehicles, 
pursuant to the terms of the Lease, after April 13, 1988, what the 
terms of the sale would be, that the vehicles were located at the 
Nate Wade Subaru car lot at 1207 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, and that the motor vehicles would be sold in the same fashion 
and manner as other used vehicles at that location (Exhibit I; 
Record, at 328-32). None of the regularly mailed notices were 
returned and no written or oral response from the Defendants 
regarding the notices was received. (Record, at 326). 
The motor vehicles were sold from the lot at Nate Wade Subaru 
within a one (1) month period, with the first vehicle being sold 
on May 10, 1988, and the last vehicle being sold on June 10, 1988. 
(Record, at 326). All Defendants admit that they have failed and 
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refused to make any payments at any time to LMV. (Record, at 370, 
385). At the time this action was commenced, MCO was a debtor in 
a case under the United States Bankruptcy Code and therefore was 
not a defendant in this case. (Record, at 367, 379). 
LMV initiated this action on April 12, 1988, seeking to hold 
the Defendants liable as guarantors for payments due under the 
Lease which were not recovered through the sale of the collateral. 
(Record, at 2-12). In August of 1988, Plaintiff moved for Summary 
Judgment. The trial court denied the Motion for Summary Judgment 
on October 13, 1988. (Record, at 402-03). On February 13, 1989, 
Plaintiff moved for Summary Judgment as to liability only. (Record, 
at 448-50). The trial court notified all parties by telephone on 
March 1, 1989, that the trial court had granted Plaintiff's Motion 
for Summary Judgment on the issue of liability. (Record, at 473; 
Defendants' Brief, at 13). On March 14, 1989, the trial judge by 
telephone conference stated that the issue of damages would be 
determined by affidavits and memoranda to be submitted by Plaintiff 
and Defendants. (Defendants' Brief, at 13). Nothing in the record 
suggests that the defendant objected to this procedure at any time. 
Nor does Defendants' appellate brief suggest that they objected at 
any time. After submission of memoranda and affidavits from all 
parties, the Defendants moved to strike the Plaintiff's affidavit 
for attorney's fees on April 24, 1989. (Record, at 531-32). 
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On April 26, 1989, the trial court announced by telephone 
conference its decision on the issue of damages (Defendants' Brief, 
at 14). In its final judgment, dated May 4, 1989, the trial court 
denied the Plaintiff's request to calculate the damages on the 
basis of liquidated damages, and decided instead that the damages 
should be based on the unamortized balance of the lease payments 
owed, plus all unpaid and accrued monthly lease payments, late 
charges, and administrative fees, less the net proceeds from the 
sale of the motor vehicles, which resulted in a final assessment 
of damages less than the Plaintiff had requested, (Exhibit J; 
Record, at 547-49). The court awarded the Plaintiff $50,500.00, 
which represents damages in the amount of $37,000.00, plus interest 
thereon at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum compounded 
annually, and attorneys' fees of $13,500.00. (Record, at 551). 
The trial court further concluded that "LMV acted in a 
commercially reasonable manner when it repossessed the motor 
vehicles and sold them on a used car lot through a private sale. 
This method of sale produced a greater amount of sales proceeds 
upon the sale of the motor vehicles than would have been produced 
by selling them at an auction to a used car dealer at substantially 
lower prices." (Record, at 550). The trial court's conclusions 
were based on uncontroverted and unopposed facts raised in 
Plaintiff's affidavits: The net proceeds from the sale of the 
motor vehicles totalled $80,100.00, which is approximately ninety-
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nine percent (99%) of the motor vehicles' wholesale values based 
on their wholesale book value as listed in Automotive Market 
Research, a weekly nationwide publication used by the fleet vehicle 
leasing industry as a benchmark for determining wholesale prices 
of automobiles. (Record, at 326). Pursuant to an effort to 
increase the amount of sale proceeds from the sale of the motor 
vehicles, LMV elected to sell the motor vehicles on a used car lot 
rather than selling them at an auction to a used car dealer at 
substantially lower prices. (Record, at 326). Mr. Ed McCracken, 
who, as controller for LMV, is "familiar with the underlying 
concepts and methods utilized in the disposition of used cars," 
(Record, at 511), attested that it is not unusual in the fleet 
vehicle leasing industry to sell repossessed vehicles through a 
used car dealership by placing the vehicles on a used car lot for 
sale. (Record, at 508-09). The trial court also denied the 
Defendants' Motion to Strike Affidavit for Attorney's Fees because 
the Plaintiff's affidavit substantially complied with the rules 
set forth in the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. (Record, at 
550-51). Defendants subsequently filed a notice of appeal on June 
1, 1989. (Record, at 553-54). 
As to each of the factual propositions raised above, 
Defendants do not oppose the factual contentions therein by way of 
counter-affidavit. Instead, Defendants attempt to rebut the trial 
court's conclusion that the sale was conducted in a commercially 
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reasonable manner by raising affidavits purporting to say that 
offers were made to the Plaintiff which were ignored. The 
affidavit of Alma Egbert, dated August 31, 1988, asserts that he 
contacted officers of LMV and LMV's attorney, Weston Harris, and 
communicated his interest in purchasing or making other 
arrangements to retain the vehicles in MCO, that he requested 
information on numerous occasions regarding the status of the 
leases and the pay-off balance but was never provided information 
regarding the leased vehicles nor given a response to his "offer", 
and that he was financially capable of purchasing all the vehicles. 
(Record, at 283-85). Egbert's affidavit does not make any mention 
of specific offer terms such as price, but only states that Egbert 
contacted LMV's representatives on different occasions and 
expressed an interest or requested information. 
Likewise the affidavit of Loren E. Weiss, dated August 18, 
1988, states that as the attorney for the debtor in possession, 
MCO, he discussed the leases with Wes Harris, the attorney for the 
Plaintiff, and informed Mr. Harris that Mr. Egbert was willing to 
assume the leases or purchase the vehicles. (Record, at 286-88). 
No mention is made of any specific contract offer _terms, such as 
price, financing, etc. 
The affidavits of Val. J. Conlin, dated February 20, 1989, and 
March 18, 1989, state that Mr. Conlin was personally familiar with 
the conditions and mileage of each of the cars under the Lease. 
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(Record, at 489 )• Mr. Conlin stated that he received the notice 
of sale and sent representatives to inspect the vehicles to insure 
that the vehicles were in reasonable operating condition and that 
he would have purchased the vehicles for Allstate for sums 
substantially in excess of the prices received by LMV. (Record, at 
468). He states that he requested that an associate, Ivar 
Blackner, inspect the cars. (Record, at 490). In Mr. Blacknerfs 
affidavit, dated September 27, 1988, he states that Mr. Conlin had 
requested him to inspect the repossessed vehicles held at Nate Wade 
Subaru in preparation for submitting bids. Mr. Blackner said he 
went to the used car lot for this purpose but was not allowed to 
see the cars, that he went back twice more and again was not 
permitted to inspect the vehicles. (Record, at 393-94). Mr. 
Blackner ' does not state any reason as to why he was denied 
permission to examine vehicles on a public car lot. None of the 
Defendants1 affidavits state that any bid or offer, written or 
oral, was ever communicated to the Plaintiff, or that any specific 
price or financing was ever discussed. Nor does Mr. Conlin in his 
affidavit assert that his willingness to purchase the vehicles for 
some substantial sum in excess of prices received by LMV Leasing 
was ever communicated to anyone. 
By contrast Mr. Conlin admits that he received the notice of 
sale. (Record, at 468). The notice of sale states that MCO had 
defaulted under the Lease, that LMV would sell the vehicles, 
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pursuant to the terms of the Lease, after April 13, 1988, what the 
terms of the sale would be, where the motor vehicles were then 
currently located, and that the motor vehicles would be sold in 
the same fashion and manner as other used vehicles at that 
location. (Record, at 328-32). The affidavit of Mr. McCracken 
states that the net proceeds from the sale of the motor vehicles 
totalled $80,100.00, after subtracting the cost of refurbishing 
the vehicles, preparing them for sale, and the costs of the sale 
itself; that the net proceeds of $80,100.00 represent approximately 
ninety-nine percent (99%) of the motor vehicles' wholesale values 
based on their wholesale book value as listed in Automotive Market 
Research, a weekly nationwide publication used by the fleet vehicle 
leasing industry as a benchmark for determining wholesale prices 
of automobiles. (Record, at 509-10). These sworn statements are 
unopposed by Defendants' affidavits. Mr. McCracken further states 
that it is not unusual in the fleet vehicle leasing industry to 
sell repossessed vehicles through a used car dealership by placing 
the vehicles on a used car lot for sale. (Record, at 326-27). 
This statement is also unopposed by Defendants. Mr. McCracken's 
affidavit of April 13, 1989, further asserts that, prior to his 
review of Mr. Egbert's petition for relief, Amended Chapter 13 
Plan, and the Order of Dismissal, Mr. McCracken had never received 
any documents, correspondence, or other material from or regarding 
Mr. Egbert concerning his financial condition, any proposed sale 
15 
of the motor vehicles, or any documentation outlining any proposal 
of any party to assume the Lease. (Record, at 512). This statement 
also goes unopposed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The trial court correctly granted summary judgment on the 
issue of liability because the Defendants1 liability as personal 
guarantors is clear regardless of whether the agreement was a lease 
or a security agreement. 
2. The trial court correctly granted summary judgment on the 
issue of damages because Plaintiff complied with the requirements 
of a commercially reasonable sale under the Utah Uniform Commercial 
Code and Defendants failed to raise a genuine issue of material 
fact. 
3. The trial court correctly granted summary judgment on the 
issue of a commercially reasonable sale because Plaintiff complied 
with the requirement of a commercially reasonable sale under the 
Lease. 
4. Defendants are barred from raising the issue of 
impairment of collateral because they failed to raise this issue 
in opposition to the motions for summary judgment and now raise 
this issue by reference to an unverified pleading. 
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5. The trial court correctly granted summary judgment on the 
issue of damages because Defendants have not raised any genuine 
issues of material fact before the trial court. 
6. The Defendants are barred from raising the issue of the 
trial court's decision based upon affidavits on the issue of 
damages because Defendants waived any rights they may have had by 
failing to raise this issue with the trial court and by awaiting 
the trial court outcome before raising the issue on appeal. 
7. The trial court correctly denied Defendants' motion to 
strike the affidavit on attorney's fees because the affidavit 
substantially complied with the requirements of Rule 4-505(1) of 
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration and applicable case law. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED THE PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO LIABILITY BECAUSE 
DEFENDANTS WERE LIABLE AS GUARANTORS OF THE CONTRACT 
REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE AGREEMENT WAS ONE FOR 
SECURITY OR WAS A LEASE. 
The standards for granting or denying summary judgment are 
clear. Although the trial court, on a motion for summary judgment, 
is obligated to view the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the defendants, Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 P. 2d 281, 283 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987), the trial court may grant summary judgment where there is 
no genuine issue of material fact or where, according to the facts 
as contended by the losing party, the moving party is entitled to 
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judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. All material facts set forth in a movant's affidavit 
which remain uncontroverted are deemed to be true for the purpose 
of summary judgment. Rule 4-501(5), Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration. Where factual contentions of the non-moving party 
are not supported by specific evidentiary facts, summary judgment 
is appropriate. Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747, 748 (Utah 
1985). 
Defendants assert that the Lease between LMV and MCO is not 
a true lease, but a lease intended for security, and therefore 
there is a disputed, material fact that could not be resolved by 
summary judgment. 
However, the issue of whether the Lease is a true lease or a 
lease intended for security does not control the issues of 
guarantor liability or the total amount of damages LMV is entitled 
to recover under the terms of the Lease. 
If the Lease is one intended as security, it is treated as 
any other security agreement under Utah's Uniform Commercial Code. 
In Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-501(l) (1981), it states in pertinent 
part: 
When a debtor is in default under a security 
agreement, a secured party has the rights and 
remedies provided in this part and except as limited 
by subsection (3) those provided in the security 
agreement. 
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(Emphasis added). Subsection (3) of § 70A-9-501 deals with 
accounting for surplus of proceeds from the sale of collateral, 
disposition of the collateral, acceptance of the collateral in 
return for discharge of the obligation, provisions for redemption 
of the collateral, and the secured party's liability for failing 
to comply with this section of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
The Lease in this case is explicit in outlining the cumulative 
and non-exclusive remedies available to LMV upon default by MCO. 
The trial court awarded damages to the Plaintiff with the Lease 
provisions and formulas in mind. (Record, at 535-42). None of 
the enumerated provisions in subsection (3) of § 70A-9-501 are 
contrary to the damages provisions of the Lease and therefore do 
not have the effect of limiting the Lease provisions. Nor have 
Defendants alleged such at trial or on appeal. Therefore, even if 
the Lease is a lease intended for security, as Defendants contend, 
the damages provisions in the Lease are still enforceable under 
Utah's Uniform Commercial Code and therefore, Defendants are liable 
to LMV for the total amount of damages under the Lease. 
Furthermore, the issue of guarantor liability is not affected 
by whether the Lease is a lease or a security agreement. Recently, 
the Utah Court of Appeals decided a case with issues similar to 
those presented in the case at hand. In First Security Financial 
v. Okland Ltd., Inc., 750 P.2d 195 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), the trial 
court granted a summary judgment against the defendant based on the 
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defendant's breach of an equipment lease agreement. The Court of 
Appeals reviewed the lower court's decision and found that the 
damages provided in the lease agreement and awarded by the local 
court were proper. In responding to the defendant's contention 
that the lease was a security agreement and therefore the damages 
provided for under the lease could not be recovered, the Court 
stated: 
Furthermore, Okland has not asserted any specific 
defenses or counterclaims as a debtor under Article 
9. Given that failure, it makes no difference if 
the contract at issue is viewed as a lease agreement 
or a sales agreement. The monthly payments required 
are either lease payments or installment sales 
payments. However denominated, monthly payments and 
any other damages designated in the contract as 
payable upon default, are recoverable as a basic 
matter of contract law in this case. 
Id. at 198-99 (emphasis added). 
Likewise, Defendants in this case assert no defenses or 
counterclaims <as to the issue of guarantor liability. As to 
damages, Defendants assert the defense of inadequate mitigation of 
damages stemming from the requirement of a commercially reasonable 
sale of the collateral. However, this requirement is no different 
than required by the Lease itself. Furthermore, Defendants have 
not asserted any other specific defenses based on the provisions 
of the Utah U.C.C. Therefore, it makes no difference whether the 
Lease is a true lease or a lease intended for security because, 
under either scenario, there is an explicit requirement of a 
commercially reasonable sale of the collateral, and defendants 
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assert no other explicit U.C.C. defense in their brief or in the 
record below. Furthermore, the Utah U.C.C. makes explicit 
provision for finding damages according to the provisions of the 
security agreement. Therefore, even if the agreement was one for 
security, LMV is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED ON THE ISSUE OF 
DAMAGES BECAUSE THE DEFENDANTS' AFFIDAVITS DO NOT 
RAISE ANY GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT SUFFICIENT 
TO OPPOSE A FINDING THAT THE VEHICLES WERE SOLD IN 
A COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE MANNER UNDER THE UTAH 
U.C.C. 
Defendants argue in one place in their brief that this Court 
should rule, as a matter of law, that the Plaintiff did not dispose 
of the vehicles in a commercially reasonable manner (see 
Defendants' Brief, at 33), yet in another place they argue merely 
that there are unresolved issues of fact precluding summary 
judgment. (See Defendants' Brief, at 15). LMV argues that under 
either scenario the trial court should be affirmed. 
A. Plaintiff Complied With The Notice Requirements Of The Utah 
Uniform Commercial Code. 
LMV asserts that the Lease entered into between it and MCO is 
a true lease. However, even if the Lease were found to be a sales 
transaction rather than a lease, LMV's notification to the 
Defendants regarding the sale of the vehicles was done in a 
commercially reasonable manner. 
In Utah's Uniform Commercial Code, § 70A-9-504(3), Utah Code 
Ann. (1981), it states: 
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••.reasonable notification of the time after which 
any private sale or other intended disposition is 
to be made shall be sent by the secured party to the 
debtor.... 
Sections 70A-1-201(26 ) and 70A-1-201(38), respectively, provide 
that: 
A person "notifies" or "gives" a notice or 
notification to another by taking such steps as may 
be reasonably required to inform the other in 
ordinary course whether or not such other actually 
comes to know of it.... 
"Send" in connection with any writing or notice 
means to deposit in the mail or deliver for 
transmission by any other usual means of 
communication with postage or cost of transmission 
provided for and properly addressed and in the case 
of an instrument to an address specified thereon or 
otherwise agreed.... 
LMV provided reasonable notification of the sale of the 
vehicles by sending the notices by certified mail, return receipt 
requested, and by regular mail to the Defendants and MCO at the 
addresses the Defendants had provided to LMV. (Record, at 325-26). 
The steps LMV took in notifying the Defendants in the ordinary 
course by properly addressing and depositing the notices in the 
mail were in strict compliance with the above statute. Finally, 
the notice itself provided the Defendants with the necessary 
information to protect themselves by permitting them to bid at the 
sale or "arrange for interested parties to bid, and to otherwise 
assure that the sale is conducted in a commercially reasonable 
manner". FMA Financial Corp. vs. Pro-Printers, 590 P.2d 803, 807 
(Utah 1979). 
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Furthermore, Defendants do not assert in their affidavits or 
memoranda to the trial court nor in their appellate brief that 
LMV's Notice of Default or the subsequent Notice of Sale do not 
meet the requirements of the Utah U.C.C. Nor do Defendants oppose 
LMVfs affidavit attesting to the service of any of the notices and 
the adequacy of the contents thereof. Therefore, LMV complied with 
the notice requirements of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code. 
B. The Sale Of The Vehicles Itself Was Reasonable Under Utah's 
Uniform Commercial Code. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-90-507(2) (1981) provides: 
If the secured party either sells the collateral in 
the usual manner in any recognized market therefor 
or if he sells at the price current in such market 
at the time of his sale or if he has otherwise sold 
in conformity with reasonable commercial practices 
among dealers in the type of property sold he has 
sold in a commercially reasonable manner. 
(Emphasis added). Further, the Utah Supreme Court, in Security 
State Bank v. Broadhead, 734 P.2d 469, 472 (Utah 1987), held that 
selling a repossessed vehicle without newspaper advertisement 
through a used car lot is commercially reasonable if doing so is 
an accepted commercial practice. 
LMV sold the vehicles in strict conformity with the above 
statute. The vehicles LMV repossessed from MCO were used vehicles. 
After their repossession, the vehicles were placed on a used car 
lot. The vehicles were sold by a used car dealer in the same 
manner as other used cars on the lot, in the same market as the 
other used cars on the lot, and in conformity with the dealer's 
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practice of selling used cars. (Record, at 508-09). In addition, 
selling repossessed vehicles in this fashion is an accepted 
commercial practice in the fleet vehicle leasing industry to which 
LMV belongs. (Record, at 508-09). Defendants1 affidavits do not 
assert any facts which controvert any of LMV's affidavits as to 
whether the* actual sale was executed in the usual manner or was in 
conformity with commercial practices among used car dealers. 
Defendants cite the Utah case of Pioneer Dodge Center, Inc. 
v. Glaubensklee, 649 P. 2d 28 (Utah 1982), for the proposition that, 
in general, an automobile dealer should advertise a repossessed car 
in a newspaper of general circulation for a reasonable period of 
time and in a manner consistent with which other used cars are 
advertised. (Defendants1 Brief, at 21). However, Defendants do not 
disclose the fact that Pioneer Dodge was a public auction case. 
By contrast, the present case did not involve a public auction, 
where advertising is presumably essential to obtain competitive 
bids. While Pioneer Dodge makes advertising a legal prerequisite 
to a reasonable public sale, that case defines "public sale" as 
"one to which the public is invited by advertisement to appear and 
bid at auction for the goods to be sold." .Id. at 30 (citing 
Restatement of Security § 48 comment (1941)). Thus, the 
requirement of advertising is inextricably intertwined with the 
concept of a public sale by auction. However, in the present case, 
the commercially reasonable practice among local used car dealers 
24 
not selling at auction is to sell in the same manner and same 
fashion as other used cars sold at the Nate Wade Subaru lot. 
Defendants do not oppose the affidavit of Ed McCracken, a 
businessman familiar with the usual methods of disposition of used 
cars, attesting to the fact that auction sales net "substantially 
lower prices" than typical used car lot sales, and that it is not 
unusual in the fleet vehicle leasing industry to sell repossessed 
vehicles through a used car dealership by placing the vehicles on 
the used car lot for sale. (Record, at 326, 508-09, 511-12). 
Plaintiff1s position is supported by the recent case of 
Security State Bank v. Broadhead, 734 P.2d 469 (Utah 1987). In 
Security State Bank, a bank repossessed a truck held as a purchase 
money security interest and sold the truck from a used car lot 
without newspaper or other public advertisement. _Id. at 470-72. 
The debtor sought reversal of a deficiency judgment obtained 
against him, arguing, inter alia, that the sale of the truck 
through a used car lot without newspaper advertisement was 
commercially unreasonable as a matter of law. Rejecting this 
claim, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Debtor insists that the sale was unreasonable 
as a matter of law because bank did not 
solicit bids through newspaper advertisement 
and received three bids on the truck. In 
support of his argument, debtor cites FMA 
Financial Corp. v. Pro-Printers, 590 P.2d 803 
(Utah 1979). Debtor's reliance on FMA 
Financial Corp. is misplaced. In that case, 
we merely commented that the creditor's 
failure to advertise the sale and its casual 
bid procedures were evidence that it had not 
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met its burden of establishing commercial 
reasonableness. Id. at 807. Whether a sale 
is commercially reasonable is a matter to be 
determined on a case-by-case basis according 
to the circumstances of the sale and the 
business context in which it occurred. 
Scharf, 700 P. 2d at 1070-71. In this case, 
bank presented expert testimony indicating 
that selling repossessed vehicles through a 
used car lot was in conformity with usual 
commercial practice. The commercial 
reasonableness of the sale is also evidenced 
by the fact that debtor's own expert witnesses 
admitted that it is rare to recover 
substantially more than Blue Book value for a 
repossessed vehicle. 
Id. at 472 (emphasis added). Although the present case is 
procedurally different, LMV supports its contention of a 
commercially reasonable sale by affidavit specifically stating that 
M[i]t is not unusual in the fleet vehicle leasing industry to sell 
repossessed vehicles through a used car dealership by . . . by 
selling them in the same manner and fashion as the other used cars 
on the lot." (Record, at 508-09). The affiant of the above 
statement attests that he is "familiar with the underlying concepts 
and methods utilized in the disposition of used cars . . . . " 
(Record, at 511). Defendants do not oppose these affidavits or 
produce any affidavits stating that it was the usual practice to 
sell repossessed vehicles on used car lots by newspaper 
advertisement. Rather, Defendants, in their brief, attempt to 
establish a requirement to advertise as a matter of law, using the 
Pioneer Dodge case as support. (See Defendants1 Brief, at 21, 33). 
Security State Bank clearly refutes such an absolute legal 
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requirement. Since there is no legal requirement, the only 
question is whether Defendants have raised in their affidavits a 
factual issue as to the need to advertise by newspaper. Since they 
failed to do this, summary judgment was appropriate. 
Defendants also claim that they were "prevented from bidding 
on the vehicles." (Defendants' Brief, at 22). However, the 
affidavit of Val Conlin, dated March 18, 1989, states that he "was 
personally familiar with conditions and mileage of each of the cars 
being leased from LMV Leasing." (Record, at 489). Conlin also 
states that he "would have purchased all of the vehicles 
repossessed." (Record, at 489). However, no where in Conlin1s 
affidavits or in Ivar Blackner's affidavit is there any affirmative 
statement indicating any communication of, or attempt to 
communicate, a bid or offer subject to the condition of an 
inspection. Furthermore, it is strange that Conlin required such 
an inspection prior to communicating a conditional bid or offer to 
LMV because Conlin states that he had "personal knowledge" of the 
condition and mileage of each of the cars and "would have" 
Defendants cite also as support the case of Haggis 
Management, Inc. v. Turtle Management, Inc., 745 P.2d 442 (Utah 
1985). However, Haggis is inapposite because it involved the 
private sale of a restaurant and liquor store without public 
advertisement. Private sale of such unique collateral without 
auction, public bidding or advertisement seems commercially 
unreasonable, unlike the common sales of used cars where there are 
established markets for resale and where sales prices are governed 
by objective pricing criteria. 
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purchased them. Rather, Defendants would impose an impossible 
standard on lessors trying to mitigate damages by requiring them 
to read the minds of prospective bidders who have failed to 
communicate their definite intentions to bid after adequate notice 
of sale. Therefore, summary judgment was appropriate because 
Conlin and Blackner failed, on the face of their affidavits, to 
communicate any bid or offer, 
C. Plaintiff Obtained A Reasonable Price For The Sale Of The 
Repossessed Vehicles. 
Section 70A-9-507(2), Utah Code Ann. (1953) states that: 
The fact that a better price could have been 
obtained by a sale at a different time or in a 
different method from that selected by the secured 
party is not of itself sufficient to establish that 
the sale was not made in a commercially reasonable 
manner. 
Pursuant to the Lease, LMV repossessed the vehicles and 
prepared them for sale. In an attempt to increase the amount of 
potential proceeds from their sale, LMV sold the vehicles through 
a used cear lot rather than auctioning them off to a used car 
dealer. (Record, at 326). The net proceeds from their sale 
totalled approximately ninety-nine percent (99%) of their combined 
wholesale value, based on the vehicles' wholesale value listed in 
Automotive Market Research, a weekly nationwide publication used 
by the fleet vehicle leasing industry to determine wholesale prices 
of automobiles. (Record, at 326). Defendants do not attempt to 
show by counter-affidavit that these prices were unreasonable. 
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Furthermore, Defendants' claim, that Conlin would have purchased 
the vehicles for sums substantially in excess of the prices 
received by LMV, is irrelevant because that intention was never 
communicated to LMV. Therefore, Defendants have failed to counter 
LMV?s affidavits showing that the sales price was commercially 
reasonable and summary judgment was appropriate. 
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED ON THE ISSUE 
OF DAMAGES BECAUSE THE DEFENDANTS' AFFIDAVITS 
DO NOT RAISE ANY GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT 
SUFFICIENT TO OPPOSE A FINDING THAT THE 
VEHICLES WERE SOLD IN A COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE 
MANNER UNDER THE CONTRACT. 
LMV asserts that the sale of the repossessed vehicles was also 
commercially reasonable as required under the Lease terms. 
However, the Defendants1 brief assumes that the Lease requirement 
of a commercially reasonable sale "requires the same tests of 
commercial reasonableness that is required by the Uniform 
Commercial Code." (Defendants' Brief, at 23). Since Defendants 
raise no new arguments and adopt the arguments and citations 
advanced under their brief's previous heading, LMV adopts those 
arguments and citations found in Point II of LMV's brief relating 
to the requirements of a commercially reasonable sale under the 
U.C.C. 
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POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED ON THE ISSUE OF 
DAMAGES BECAUSE THE DEFENDANTS DID NOT PROPERLY 
RAISE THE ISSUE OF IMPAIRMENT OF COLLATERAL BEFORE 
THE TRIAL COURT. 
Defendants raise four contentions with respect to their 
argument that LMV was estopped from seeking recovery because of 
impairment of the collateral: (1) that LMV ignored the December 
1987 offer of Alma D. Egbert; (2) that LMV permitted Roy Mallory 
and Alma D. Egbert to use the vehicles for rentals from December 
1987 until March 1988; (3) that, after repossessing the cars, LMV 
failed to advertise the vehicles for sale; and (4) that LMV refused 
to permit Defendants to inspect the vehicles. (Defendants' Brief, 
at 23). 
LMV submits that all four contentions fail to raise issues of 
material fact going to the issue of impairment of collateral. The 
case authority cited by Defendants, Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Rite 
Way Concrete Forming, Inc., 742 P.2d 105 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), 
speaks of a fiduciary relationship arising between a creditor and 
guarantor and that a guarantor may be partially or wholly 
discharged from liability "where a creditor's actions impair the 
value of collateral in its possession . . . ." _Id. at 108 (emphasis 
added). Since questions of ignoring offers, failing to advertise, 
and refusing permission to inspect do not actually affect the value 
of the collateral, but arguably go instead to the reasonable 
disposition of collateral, the first, third, and fourth contentions 
30 
should be dismissed. Furthermore, the first and second contentions 
should be dismissed because the cars, prior to their repossession 
in March, 1987 (Defendants1 Brief, at 10), were not in the 
possession of the creditor, as required in Valley Bank, thus giving 
rise to no fiduciary duties. 
In addition to the above reasons, the issue of impairment of 
collateral should be dismissed because Defendants base their theory 
on a right of subrogation, a right that the Defendants1 case 
authority concedes does not even arise until payment of the 
guaranteed obligation by the guarantor. (See Defendants' Brief, at 
24-25). Since the defendants/guarantors in this case never made 
payment of the guaranteed obligation, no right of subrogation ever 
arose, and therefore no concurrent fiduciary duty arose. 
Finally, in addition to all the above reasons, Defendants' 
argument that an estoppel arose based on impairment of the 
collateral should be rejected because this issue was never 
appropriately raised at the trial court. None of the Defendants' 
memoranda in opposition to the Plaintiff's motions for summary 
judgment specifically raised the issue now raised as to impairment 
of collateral. Matters not presented to the trial court may not 
be raised for the first time on appeal. Salt Lake City Corp. v. 
James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 46 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
(quoting Franklin Financial v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 
1044 (Utah 1983)). 
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Furthermore, Defendants' second amended answer, which 
Defendants cite for having raised the issue, is not a verified 
pleading. (Defendants' Brief, at 23; Record, at 367-75), Under 
Utah case law, an unverified pleading will not substitute for an 
affidavit and therefore will not preclude summary judgment. See, 
e.g. , Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696, 698 (Utah 1985). For 
all of the above reasons, Defendants1 argument that an estoppel 
arose because of Plaintiff's impairment of the collateral should 
be rejected. 
POINT V: THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DECIDED THE ISSUE OF 
DAMAGES BECAUSE THE DEFENDANTS' AFFIDAVITS DO NOT 
RAISE ANY GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT AS TO 
WHETHER THERE WAS MITIGATION OF DAMAGES. 
It is well established that a non-breaching party to a 
contract is obligated to take reasonable steps to mitigate his 
damages. Pratt v. Board of Educ, 564 P.2d 294, 298 (Utah 1977). 
Defendants assert that LMV failed to mitigate its damages 
by supposedly rejecting an offer made by Alma D. Egbert ("Egbert") 
to purchase the leased vehicles or assume the Lease from MCO. In 
support of this contention, an affidavit of Egbert was filed 
stating that he contacted LMV and "communicated his interest in 
purchasing the vehicles or in making other arrangements with LMV" 
regarding the Lease. (Record, at 284). In addition, an affidavit 
of Loren E. Weiss ("Weiss") was filed, stating that Weiss informed 
LMVfs counsel that Egbert was "willing to assume the leases or 
purchase the vehicles from LMV." (Record, at 287). Defendants rely 
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on these vague contentions in the affidavits to form the basis for 
their defense that LMV rejected Egbertfs "offer" which could have 
totally mitigated LMV's damages. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Pratt, held that "[m]itigation of 
damages is an affirmative defense. Although plaintiff is obligated 
to minimize his damages, the burden is upon the party whose 
wrongful act caused the damages to prove anything in diminution 
thereof." 564 P. 2d at 298. Defendants have the burden of alleging 
facts sufficient to raise an issue as to whether there as an 
"offer" made by Egbert which would have substantially or totally 
mitigated LMVfs damages as they claim it would. 
Defendants fail to raise a material issue in their affidavits. 
First, Egbert's affidavit only attests to having communicated an 
"interest" in purchasing the car or assuming the Lease. There is 
no affirmative language in the affidavit asserting facts 
establishing an offer. There is only conclusory language in 
Paragraph 6 of the Egbert Affidavit that there was no "response to 
his offer and inquiry." (Record, at 284). The Utah Supreme Court 
has held that conclusory statements are insufficient to create a 
genuine issue of fact. Reagan Outdoor Advertising Inc. v. 
Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776, 779 (Utah 1984). The mere conclusion in 
an affidavit that there was an offer, without alleging facts 
sufficient to conclude that some kind of offer was made, is 
insufficient and should not preclude summary judgment. Merely 
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communicating an "interest" in the vehicles does not allege facts 
sufficient to establish an offer. Second, neither Egbert's nor 
Weiss' affidavit contain any terms of an alleged "offer" to 
purchase vehicles or assume the Lease, the price Egbert was willing 
to pay for the vehicles, or how this "offer" would mitigate 
Plaintiff's damages. In short, nothing is presented that raises 
any genuine issues of material fact regarding how LMV could have 
mitigated its damages. 
Furthermore, it is impossible for the Court, based upon the 
lack of material facts presented by Defendants, to determine 
whether an "offer" by Egbert to buy the vehicles or assume the 
Lease with LMV could have substantially or totally mitigated LMVs 
damages as Defendants contend. 
Similar deficiencies lie in the affidavits of Conlin and 
Blackner. In Conlin's affidavit of March 18, 1989, Conlin 
represents that he "was personally familiar with conditions and 
mileage of each of the cars being leased from LMV Leasing." 
(Record, at 489). He also asserts that he "would have purchased 
all of th€i vehicles repossessed . . . ." (Record, at 489). However, 
in neither Conlinfs affidavits nor in Blackner's affidavit is there 
any fact alleged as to any attempt to communicate any offer or bid, 
oral or written, to LMV personnel. Blackner's affidavit says that 
he was denied access to the used car lot by Nate Wade Subaru 
personnel but does not allege any specific facts beyond the 
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personal conclusion that he was denied access. (Record, at 393-
94). The affidavit does not state the reason he was denied access, 
the dates on which he attempted to see the cars, or whether the 
cars at that moment were being held out for sale to the public. 
However, in light of the fact that Conlin was already "personally 
familiar with [the] conditions and mileage of each of the cars" and 
"would have purchased" them, it is strange that he did not simply 
make an offer subject to the condition of an inspection. 
Defendants hold LMV to the impossible standard of having to 
decipher the minds of potential bidders despite the fact that no 
prospective or conditional bids or offers were made. 
Finally, Defendants' Comparison Sheet, attached as an exhibit 
to their Memorandum of Damages (Record, at 498), comparing the 
prices at which LMV actually sold the vehicles to the average price 
of the Kelly Blue Book Retail and the Kelly Blue Book Wholesale, 
is misleading. Defendants compare the net sales proceeds of each 
car which LMV obtained to the gross sales price in the Kelly Blue 
Book average. (See Record, at 498). Even if most of the sales 
costs could be reduced by selling to Conlin, this factual issue is 
irrelevant where Defendants failed to communicate such bid or offer 
to LMV. 
Therefore, the trial court's decision that no genuine issues 
of material fact remained on the issue of mitigation of damages 
should be affirmed. 
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POINT VI: THE DEFENDANTS WAIVED THEIR RIGHT TO OBJECT TO THE 
TRIAL COURT'S DECISION ON DAMAGES BY AFFIDAVIT WHEN 
THEY FAILED TO OBJECT AT THE TIME OF FILING THEIR 
MEMORANDUM ON DAMAGES OR AT ANY TIME UPON THE 
RECORD. 
The Defendants1 brief concedes that "[o]n March 14, 1989, 
Judge Brian by telephone conference stated the issue of damages 
would be determined by Affidavits and Memorandums to be submitted 
by plaintiff and defendants simultaneously." (Defendant's Brief, 
at 13). Nowhere in their brief do Defendants state that they 
objected to this procedure at the time of the telephone conference, 
nor do they cite any objection filed with the Court or entered at 
any time on the record. Defendants, however, do assert that they 
"did not agree or stipulate to this procedure nor were the parties 
asked if this procedure was acceptable." (Defendants1 Brief, at 
30). By this statement, the Defendants wish to place the burden 
of identifying error on the trial judge. 
"It is axiomatic that matters not presented to the trial court 
may not be raised for the first time on appeal." Salt Lake City 
Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 46 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988) (quoting Franklin Financial v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659 P. 2d 
1040, 1044 (Utah 1983)). See also, Hobelman Motors, Inc. v. 
Allred, 685 P.2d 544 (Utah 1984) (plaintiffs failure to raise 
issue of incorrectly notarized affidavit at time of summary 
judgment waived his right to raise this issue on appeal); Franklin 
Financial v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 1983) 
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("For a question to be considered on appeal, the record must 
clearly show that it was timely presented to the trial court in a 
manner sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon . . . . " ) . This rule 
has been applied even in cases raising issues of constitutional 
dimension. See, e.g., Salt Lake County v. Carlston, 776 P.2d 653 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). Furthermore, it is fair and just to apply 
this rule in this case because the Defendants should not be able 
to file a memorandum of damages without any objection at any time 
to the method of disposition, wait to see whether disposition is 
favorable or not, and then raise this objection on appeal. 
The same rule should apply regardless of Defendants' argument 
that the simultaneous submission of memoranda and affidavits on 
damages had the effect of shifting the burden of proof to the 
Defendants. First, the burden of proof did not shift, as explained 
below. However, even if this argument is true, it was foreseeable 
prior to submission of the memoranda on damages. The Defendants, 
therefore, should have cured this defect at the trial level, and 
delay in raising this issue causes it to be waived. See Hobelman 
Motors, 685 P.2d at 546; Strange v. Ostlund, 594 P.2d 877, 880 
(Utah 1979). 
Simultaneous submission of documents does not have the effect 
of shifting the burden of proof because Defendants could have 
sought permission of the court to respond further to any of LMV's 
arguments or affidavits. The record shows that LMV submitted its 
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primary affidavit on damages on April 13, 1989 (Record, at 502-
13), two v/eeks before the trial judge ruled, on April 26, 1989 
(Defendants' Brief, at 14). Defendants could have acted during 
this period of time, as illustrated by their submission of a Motion 
to Strike Plaintiff's Affidavit on April 24, 1989, (Record, at 531-
32). Furthermore, Utah precedent states that mitigation of damages 
is an affirmative defense and the burden is upon the party whose 
wrongful act caused the damages to prove anything in diminution 
thereof. Pratt v. Board of Educ, 564 P.2d 294, 298 (Utah 1977). 
Since, at the damages portion of the proceedings below, liability 
had already been established, showing that the Defendants had 
committed the wrongful acts giving rise to the damages, the burden 
should properly be placed at the feet of the Defendants. Where the 
Defendant has failed to sustain its burden, by producing competent 
evidence suggesting Plaintiff had not taken reasonable efforts to 
mitigate his damages, the trial court may properly determine that 
there was no factual issue concerning damages to submit to the 
jury. Id. 
POINT VII: THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED THE 
DEFENDANTS1 MOTION TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT FOR 
ATTORNEY FEES BECAUSE THE AFFIDAVIT 
SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH THE TERMS OF THE 
UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION AND 
APPLICABLE CASE LAW. 
Defendants correctly represent that the affidavit of Brett F. 
Wood stated the hours spent by each of LMVfs attorneys on the case 
but does not specify the hourly rate of each of the four (4) 
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attorneys. The affidavit also specifies the number of hours and 
the rates per hour of the non-attorneys and the total bill charged 
for services by attorneys and non-attorneys. (Record, at 527-28). 
Defendants specifically complain that the affidavit should have 
stated the hourly rate of each attorney working on the case and 
because it did not so state, the trial court erred in denying the 
Defendants* Motion to Strike the affidavit. 
Rule 4-505(1) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
states: 
Affidavits in support of an award of attorneys' 
fees must set forth specifically the legal basis for 
the award, the nature of the work performed by the 
attorney, the number of hours spent to prosecute the 
claim to judgment, or the time spent in pursuing the 
matter to the stage for which attorneys' fees are 
claimed, and affirm the reasonableness of the fees 
for comparable legal services. The affidavit must 
also separately state the hours by persons other 
than attorneys, for time spent, work completed and 
hourly rate billed. 
A plain reading of the provision clearly shows that the only 
hourly rate disclosure required is for non-attorneys. Attorneys 
are clearly not required to state their rate. Nevertheless, the 
average rate charged by LMVfs attorneys may be determined by 
dividing the total attorney bill by the amount of attorney hours 
spent on the case. For example, subtraction of the costs of clerks 
and other firm personnel from the total requested bill of 
$19,171.72 (Record, at 528) yields a total attorney fees bill of 
$18,862.71. The total number of hours spent by LMVfs attorney in 
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this case was 221.20, as calculated from the figures in the 
affidavit. (Record, at 528). This yields an hourly rate, when 
divided into the total fee amount, of $85.27 per hour, which is a 
reasonable hourly rate for comparable services done in the local 
2 legal community. (Record, at 530). Thus, Defendants could have 
arrived at the average fee rate by some simple arithmetic on a 
calculator. 
The case of Talley v. Talley, 739 P. 2d 83 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987), cited as support by the Defendants, does not require 
explicit disclosure of attorney hourly rates. In fact, that case 
does not even deal with the specific issue raised by Defendants 
because the hourly rates of all those involved was explicitly 
disclosed in the contested exhibit on attorney fees. Id., at 84. 
Rather, Talley dealt only with the issue of the reasonableness of 
the disclosed fees in light of the difficulty of the case and the 
result accomplished. Id.. Since the Defendants' Motion to Strike 
the affidavit dealt only with the issue of not explicitly stating 
the hourly rate, and did not aver any unreasonableness in the fees 
It should be noted that the actual attorney fees awarded 
in this case, $13,500.00, was much less than requested. (Compare 
Record, at 527-28, with Record, at 542). Dividing the latter 
amount, $13,500.00, by the number of attorney hours spent yields 
an hourly rate of $61.03, a very low rate in the local legal 
community. 
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or rate charged, despite the fact that the rate could easily be 
obtained by calculator, the Defendants1 appeal of the trial court's 
denial of the motion should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court granted summary judgment first as to the issue 
of liability, and then as to the issues of damages and attorney 
fees. 
Since the Defendants are liable as guarantors regardless of 
whether the agreement was a lease or a security agreement, this 
Court should affirm the trial court's summary judgment on the issue 
of liability. It is immaterial whether the agreement was a lease 
or a security agreement because the requirement of a commercially 
reasonable sale of the vehicles is a requirement of both the Lease 
and the Utah U.C.C. 
The trial court's grant of summary judgment on the issue of 
damages should also be affirmed because Defendants do not oppose 
LMV's affidavits containing facts upon which the trial court relied 
in making findings and conclusions supporting the reasonableness 
of the sales. Further, Defendants' affidavits only make conclusory 
statements that an "offer" was made, while failing to affirmatively 
assert that any kind of actual bid or offer was ever communicated 
to LMV. Also, Defendants' affidavits fail to show by specific 
evidentiary facts, Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747 (Utah 
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1985), that there was an offer, or even if there was an offer, how 
such offer would have further mitigated LMVfs damages. Therefore, 
Defendants fail to raise any genuine issues of material fact 
relating to the commercially reasonable sale of the vehicles or to 
mitigation of damages. 
Defendants also fail to raise any genuine issues of material 
fact and are barred on procedural grounds from raising issues as 
to an estoppel arising from impairment of the collateral, or as to 
deciding the issue of damages by affidavit without hearing, because 
Defendants failed to properly raise these issues before the trial 
court. 
Finally, Defendants1 Motion to Strike LMVfs affidavit on 
attorneys fees was properly denied because Defendants failed to 
demonstrate how their position is justified under the rules or case 
law. 
Therefore, the trial court's grant of summary judgment should 
be affirm€id as to liability, damages and attorney fees. 
Additionally, LMV respectfully requests this Court to award 
to LMV additional attorney fees it has accrued in working on this 
appeal based on section 18.2 of the Lease, which provides, as one 
of the Lessor's remedies, the right to recover any expenses paid 
for attorneys' fees, legal expenses and court costs. (Record, at 
23). See, G.G.A., Inc. v. Leventis, 773 P.2d 841, 846-47 (Utah 
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Bailey, 676 P.2d 391, 393 (Utah 1984). 
Respectfully submitted, 
WATKISS & SAPERSTEIN 
Weston L. Harris 
Paul A. Hoffman 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am an attorney licensed to practice 
under the laws of the State of Utah and that I mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF THE RESPONDENT to the 
following: 
D. Frank Wilkins, Esq. 
HALEY & STOLEBARGER 
175 South Main, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Co-counsel for 
Defendants and Appellants 
Kenneth M. Hisatake, Esq. 
1825 South Seventh East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
Co-counsel for 
Defendants and Appellants 
by depositing a properly addressed envelope containing the same in 
the United States Mail, postage prepaid, this / •$ / day of 
December, 1989. 
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Exhibit C Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-504 (1981) 
Exhibit D Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-507 (1981) 
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31) 
Exhibit G Guaranty of Conlins (Record, at 111) 
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Exhibit J Final Judgment, May 4, 1989 (Record, at 544-51) 
EXHIBIT A 
70A-1-201 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
(20) "Holder" means a person who is in possession of a document of 
title or an instrument or an investment security drawn, issued or 
indorsed to him or to his order or to bearer or in blank. 
(21) To "honor" is to pay or to accept and pay, or where a credit so 
engages to purchase or discount a draft complying with the terms 
of the credit. 
(22) "Insolvency proceedings" includes any assignment for the benefit 
of creditors or other proceedings intended to liquidate or rehabili-
tate the estate of the person involved. 
(23) A person is "insolvent" who either has ceased to pay his debts in 
the ordinary course of business or cannot pay his debts as they 
become due or is insolvent within the meaning of the federal bank-
ruptcy law. 
(24) "Money" means a medium of exchange authorized or adopted by 
a domestic or foreign government as a part of its currency. 
(25) A person has "notice" of a fact when 
(a) he has actual knowledge of it; or 
(b) he has received a notice or notification of it; or 
(c) from all the facts and circumstances known to him at the 
time in question he has reason to know that it exists. 
A person "knows" or has "knowledge" of a fact when he has actual knowl-
edge of it. "Discover" or "learn" or a word or phrase of similar import 
refers to knowledge rather than to reason to know. The time and circum-
stances under which a notice or notification may cease to be effective are 
not determined by this act. 
(26) A person "notifies" or "gives" a notice or notification to another 
by taking such steps as may be reasonably required to inform the 
other in ordinary course whether or not such other actually comes 
to know of it. A person "receives" a notice or notification when 
(a) it comes to his attention; or 
(b) it is duly delivered at the place of business through which 
the contract was made or at any other place held out by him 
as the place for receipt of such communications. 
(27) Notice, knowledge of a notice or notification received by an orga-
nization is effective for a particular transaction from the time when 
it is brought to the attention of the individual conducting that 
transaction, and in any event from the time when it would have 
been brought to his attention if the organization had exercised due 
diligence. An organization exercises due diligence if it maintains 
reasonable routines for communicating significant information to 
the person conducting the transaction and there is reasonable com-
pliance with the routines. Due diligence does not require an indi-
vidual acting for the organization to communicate information 
unless such communication is part of his regular duties or unless 
he has reason to know of the transaction and that the transaction 
would be materially affected by the information. 
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(28) "Organization" includes a corporation, government or governmen-
tal subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership 
or association, two or more persons having a joint or common 
interest, or any other legal or commercial entity. 
(29) "Party," as distinct from "third party," means a person who has 
engaged in a transaction or made an agreement within this act. 
(30) "Person" includes an individual or an organization (See section 
70A-M02). 
(31) "Presumption" or "presumed" means that the trier of fact must 
find the existence of the fact presumed unless and until evidence 
is introduced which would support a finding of its nonexistence. 
(32) "Purchase" includes taking by sale, discount, negotiation, mortgage, 
pledge, lien, issue or re-issue, gift or any other voluntary trans-
action creating an interest in property. 
(33) "Purchaser" means a person who takes by purchase. 
(34) "Remedy" means any remedial right to which an aggrieved party 
is entitled with or without resort to a tribunal. 
(35) "Representative" includes an agent, an officer of a corporation or 
association, and a trustee, executor or administrator of an estate, 
or any other person empowered to act for another. 
(36) "Rights" includes remedies. 
(37) "Security interest" means an interest in personal property or fix-
tures which secures payment or performance of an obligation. The 
retention or reservation of title by a seller of goods notwithstand-
ing shipment or delivery to the buyer (section 70A-2-401) is limited 
in effect to a reservation of a "security interest." The term also 
includes any interest of a buyer of account or chattel paper which 
is subject to chapter 9. The special property interest of a buyer of 
goods on identification of such goods to a contract for sale under 
section 70A-2-401 is not a "security interest," but a buyer may also 
acquire a "security interest" by complying with chapter 9. Unless 
a lease or consignment is intended as security, reservation of title 
thereunder is not a "security interest" but a consignment is in any 
event subject to the provisions on consignment sales (section 
70A-2-326). Whether a lease is intended as security is to be deter-
mined by the facts of each case; however, (a) the inclusion of an 
option to purchase does not of itself make the lease one intended 
for security, and (b) an agreement that upon compliance with the 
terms of the lease the lessee shall become or has the option to 
become the owner of the property for no additional consideration 
or for a nominal consideration does make the lease one intended 
for security. 
(38) "Send" in connection with any writing or notice means to deposit 
in the mail or deliver for transmission by any other usual means 
of communication with postage or cost of transmission provided for 
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and properly addressed and in the case of an instrument to an 
address specified thereon or otherwise agreed, or if there be none 
to any address reasonable under the circumstances. The receipt of 
any writing or notice within the time at which it would have 
arrived if properly sent has the effect of a proper sending. 
(39) "Signed" includes any symbol executed or adopted by a party with 
present intention to authenticate a writing. 
(40) "Surety" includes guarantor. 
(41) "Telegram" includes a message transmitted by radio, teletype, 
cable, any mechanical method of transmission, or the like. 
(42) "Term" means that portion of an agreement which relates to a par-
ticular matter. 
(43) "Unauthorized" signature or indorsement means one made without 
actual, implied or apparent authority and includes a forgery. 
(44) "Value." Except as otherwise provided with respect to negotiable 
instruments and bank collections (sections 70A-3 303, 70A-4-208 
and 70A-4-209) a person gives "value" for rights if he acquires 
them 
(a) in return for a binding commitment to extend credit or for 
the extension of immediately available credit whether or not 
drawn upon and whether or not a charge-back is provided 
for in the event of difficulties in collection; or 
(b) as security for or in total or partial satisfaction of a pre-
existing claim; or 
(c) by accepting delivery pursuant to a pre-existing contract for 
purchase; or 
(d) generally, in return for any consideration sufficient to sup-
port a simple contract. 
(45) "Warehouse receipt" means a receipt issued by a person engaged 
in the business of storing goods for hire. 
(46) "Written" or "writing" includes printing, typewriting or any other 
intentional reduction to tangible form. 
History: L 1965, ch. 154, } 1-201; 197?, ch. 
272,}2. 
Compiler's Notts. 
Tht 1977 amendment inserted the second 
sentence in subtec (9); substituted "of for 
"or" near the beginning of subsee (27); and 
substituted "buyer of account or chattel 
patsr" in the third sentence ot subsec. (37) 
fsv "buyer of accounts, chattel paper." 
Geo* faith. 
"Good faith" within the meaning of this 
section requires only an honest belief by a 
creditor that he is insecure, not that the 
belief be reasonable; where bank's honest 
belief was that its prospects for repayment 
were impaired by borrower's conduct of his 
mink ranching business and his loss by theft 
ot a substantial quantity of mink pelts, it 
acted in good faith in invoking acceleration 
clause of loan agreement, and the reason-
ableness of its belief in its insecurity was 
irrelevant. State Bank of Lehi v. Wooisey (1977) 565 P 2d 413. 
Lease as security interest. 
The option price was nominal and the lease 
with an option to purchase was intended as 
security where the option price was 10% of 
the original cost of the property, and only 
6% of the total lease payments, and at the 
time the option was to be exercised the prop-
erty still had a useful life so as to leave the 
lessee with no sensible alternative but to 
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is intended as security (section 70A-1-20H37)). However, if it is determined 
for other reasons that the consignment or lease is so intended, a security 
interest of the consignor or lessor which attaches to the consigned or 
leased goods is perfected by such filing. 
History? C. 1953, 70A-9-408, enacted by L. relating to the destruction of old records by 
1977, ch. 272, § 34. the filing officer, and enacted a new section 
., , M * 70A-9-408. 
Compiler • Notes. 
Uws 1977, ch. 272, §34 repealed old 
section 70A-9-408 (L. 1965, ch. 154, § 9-408), 
70A-9-409. Destruction of old records. Unless a filing officer has 
notice of an action pending relative thereto, he may remove from the file 
and destroy 
(1) a lapsed financing statement, a lapsed continuation statement, a 
statement of assignment or release relating to either, and any 
index of any of them, one year or more after lapse; and 
(2) a termination statement and the index on which it is noted, one 
year or more after the filing of the termination statement. 
History: C. 1953, 70A-9-409, enacted by L. 
1977, ch. 272, § 35. 
PART 5 
DEFAULT 
Section 
70A-9-501. Default — Procedure when security agreement covers both real and personal 
property. 
70A-9-502. Collection rights of secured party. 
70A-9-503. Secured party's right to take possession after default. 
70A-9-504. Secured party's right to dispose of collateral after default — rect of disposition. 
70A-9-505. Compulsory disposition of collateral — Acceptance of the c< .:eral as discharge 
of obligation. 
70A-9-506. Debtor's right to redeem collateral. 
70A-9-507. Secured party's liability for failure to comply with this part. 
70A-9-501. Default — Procedure when security agreement covers 
both real and personal property. 
(1) When a debtor is in default urider a security agreement, a secured 
party has the rights and remedies provided in this part and except 
as limited by subsection (3) those provided in the security agree-
ment He may reduce his clainvto judgment, foreclose or otherwise 
enforce the security interest by any available judicial procedure. If 
the collateral is documents the secured party may proceed either 
as to the documents or as to the goods covered thereby. A secured 
party in possession has the rights, remedies and duties provided 
in section 70A-9-207. The rights and remedies referred to in this 
subsection are cumulative. 
(2) After default, the debtor has the rights and remedies provided in 
this part, those provided in the security agreement and those pro-
vided in section 70A-9-207. 
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(3) To the extent that they give rights to the debtor and impose duties 
on the secured party, the rules stated in the subsections referred 
to below may not be waived or varied except as provided with 
respect to compulsory disposition of collateral (subsection (3) of 
section 70A-9-504 and section 70A-9-505) and with respect to 
redemption of collateral (section 70A-9-506) but the parties may by 
agreement determine the standards by which the fulfillment of 
these rights and duties is to be measured if such standards are not 
manifestly unreasonable: 
(a) subsection (2) of section 70A-9-502 and subsection (2) of 
section 70A-9-504 in so far as they require accounting for 
surplus proceeds of collateral; 
(b) subsection (3) of section 70A-9-504 and subsection (1) of 
section 70A-9-505 which deal with disposition of collateral; 
(c) subsection (2) of section 70A-9-505 which deals with accep-
tance of collateral as discharge of obligation; 
(d) section 70A-9-506 which deals with redemption of collateral; 
and 
(e) subsection (1) of section 70A-9-507 which deals with the 
secured party's liability for failure to comply with this part. 
(4) If the security agreement covers both real and personal property, 
the secured party may proceed under this part as to the personal 
property or he may proceed as to both the real and the personal 
property in accordance with his rights and remedies in respect of 
the real property in which case the provisions of this part do not 
apply. 
(5) When a secured party has reduced his claim to judgment the lien 
of any levy which may be made upon his collateral by virtue of 
any execution based upon the judgment shall relate back to the 
date of the perfection of the security interest in such collateral. A 
judicial sale, pursuant to such execution, is a foreclosure of the 
security interest by judicial procedure within the meaning of this 
section, and the secured party may purchase at the sale and there-
after hold the collateral free of any other requirements of this 
chapter. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, i 9-50l> 1977, ch. 
272,J36. 
CMpikr's Notes. 
Ths 1977 amendment substituted "(subsec-
tioa (3) of section 70A -9-504 and section 
70A-9-606)" in the middle of the first para-
graph of subsec. (3) for "(subsection (1) of 
section 70A-9-506)." 
Cross References, 
Executions, exemptions from, 78-23-1. 
Garnishment, procedure when garnishee is 
mortgagee or pledgee, Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, Rule 640 (o). 
Jurisdiction of circuit courts on foreclo-
sure, 78-4-7. 
Policy and subject matter of chapter, 
70A-9-102. 
Real estate mortgages, foreclosure, 78-37-1 
et seq. 
Rights and duties when collateral is in 
secured party's possession, 70A-9-207. 
Secured party's right to take possession 
and dispose of collateral after default, 
70A-9-508, 70A-9-504. 
Transactions excluded from chapter, 
70A-9-104. 
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of ths lsst sentence ot subsec. (2); and made Transactions excluded from chapter, 
minor changes in punctuation. 70A-9-104. 
Use or disposition of collateral without 
Crm+BMhrincf. accounting permissible, 70A-9-205. 
Liability of secured party for failure to 
comply with part 5 of this chapter, Collateral References, 
70A-9-507. Secured Transactions <S» 227. 
Policy and scope of chapter, 70A-9-102. 79 CJS Supp. Secured Transactions § 104. 
Secured party's rights on disposition of 69 AmJur 2d 469 to 473, Secured Trans-
collateral, 70A-9-306. actions §§ 580 to 582. 
Secured party's right to dispose of collat-
eral after default, 70A-9-5O4. 
70A-9-503. Secured party's right to take possession after default. 
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take 
possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may pro-
ceed without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the 
peace or may proceed by action. If the security agreement so provides the 
secured party may require the debtor to assemble the collateral and make 
it available to the secured party at a place to be designated by the secured 
party which is reasonably convenient to both parties. Without removal a 
secured party may render equipment unusable, and may dispose of collat-
eral on the debtor's premises under section 70A-9-504. If a secured party 
elects to proceed by process of law he may proceed by writ of replevin or 
otherwise. 
History: L 1965, ch. 154, § 9-503. 
Validity, under state law, of self-help 
Cross-References. repossession of goods pursuant to UCC 
Secured party's right to dispose of collat- i 9 '503 ' 75 A L R 3d 1061. 
eral after default, 70A-9-504. L * W Review*. 
Collateral References. Breach of the Peace and New Mexico's Uni-form Commercial Code, 4 Natural Resources 
Secured Transactions $=* 228. j . g5. 
79 CJS Supp. Secured Transactions § 105. Note, Sniadach, Fuentes and Mitchell: A 
69 AmJur 2d 473 to 497, Secured Trans- Confusing Trilogy and Utah Prejudgment 
actions §4 583 to 599. Remedies, 1974 Utah L. Rev. 536. 
DECISIONS UNtiER FORMER LAW 
Replevin. gagee could maintain action in claim and 
Where chattel mortgage provided that in delivery to recover such possession after 
event default was made in payment of debt default, remedy by foreclosing mortgage not 
mortgafts could take possession of property being exclusive. Morgan v. Layton (1922) 60 
and proceed to foreclose mortgage, mort- U 280, 208 P 505. 
70A-9-504. Secured party's right to dispose of collateral after 
default — Effect of disposition. 
(1) A secured party after default may sell, lease or otherwise dispose 
of any or all of the collateral in its then condition or following any 
commercially reasonable preparation or processing. Any sale of 
goods is subject to the chapter on Sales (chapter 2). The proceeds 
of disposition shall be applied in the order following to 
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(a) the reasonable expenses of retaking, holding, preparing for 
sale or lease, selling, leasing and the like and, to the extent 
provided for in the agreement and not prohibited by law, the 
reasonable attorneys' fees and legal expenses incurred by the 
secured party; 
(b) the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by the security 
interest under which the disposition is made; 
(c) the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by any subordinate 
security interest in the collateral if written notification of 
demand therefor is received before distribution of the pro-
ceeds is completed. If requested by the secured party, the 
holder of a subordinate security interest must seasonably 
furnish reasonable proof of his interest, and unless he does 
so, the secured party need not comply with his demand. 
(2) If the security interest secures an indebtedness, the secured party 
must account to the debtor for any surplus, and, unless otherwise 
agreed, the debtor is liable for any deficiency. But if the underlying 
transaction was a sale of accounts or chattel paper, the debtor is 
entitled to any surplus or is liable for any deficiency only if the 
security agreement so provides. 
(3) Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private proceed-
ings and may be made by way of one or more contracts. Sale or 
other disposition may be as a unit or in parcels and at any time 
and place and on any terms but every aspect of the disposition 
including the method, manner, time, place and terms must be com-
mercially reasonable. Unless collateral is perishable or threatens 
to decline speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold on a 
recognized market, reasonable notification of the time and place of 
any public sale or reasonable notification of the time after which 
any private sale or other intended disposition is to be made shall 
be sent by the secured party to the debtor, if he has not signed 
after default a statement renouncing or modifying his right to noti-
fication of sale. In the case of consumer goods no other notification 
need be sent. In other cases notification shall be sent to any other 
secured party from whom the secured party has received (before 
sending his notification to the debtor or before the debtor's renun-
ciation of his rights) written notice of a claim of an interest in the 
collateral. The secured party may buy at any public sale and if the 
collateral is of a type customarily sold in a recognized market or 
is of a type which is the subject of widely distributed standard 
price quotations he may buy at private sale. 
(4) When collateral is disposed of by a secured party after default, the 
disposition transfers to a purchaser for value all of the debtor's 
rights therein, discharges the security interest under which it is 
made and any security interest or lien subordinate thereto. The 
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purchaser takes free of all such rights and interests even though 
the secured party fails to comply with the requirements of this part 
or of any judicial proceedings 
(a) in the case of a public sale, if the purchaser has no knowl-
edge of any defects in the sale and if he does not buy in col-
lusion with the secured party, other bidders or the person 
conducting the sale; or 
(b) in any other case, if the purchaser acts in good faith. 
(5) A person who is liable to a secured party under a guaranty, 
indorsement, repurchase agreement or the like and who receives a 
transfer of collateral from the secured party or is subrogated to 
his rights has thereafter the rights and duties of the secured party. 
Such a transfer of collateral is not a sale or disposition of the col-
lateral under this chapter. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 9-504; 1977, ch. 
272, §38. 
Compiler'* Notes. 
The 1977 amendment inserted "or lease" 
near the beginning of subd. (1) (a); added the 
second sentence of subsec. (2) relating to a 
sale of accounts or chattel paper; substituted 
"if he has not signed after default a state-
ment renouncing or modifying his right to 
notification of sale" at the end of the third 
sentence of subsec. (3) for uand except in the 
case of consumer goods to any other person 
who has a security interest in the collateral 
and who has duly filed a financing statement 
indexed in the name of the debtor in this 
state or who is known by the secured party 
to have a security interest in the collateral"; 
and inserted the fourth sentence of subsec. 
(3) relating to notification of other secured 
parties. 
Cross- References. 
Collateral not owned by debtor, 70A-9-112. 
Compulsory disposition of collateral, 
70A-9-505. 
Contract for sale of goods, breach by 
buyer, resale by seller, 70A-2-706. 
Policy and subject matter of chapter/ 
70A-9-102. 
Secured party's liability for failure to com-
ply with part 5 of this chapter, 70A-9-507. 
Forsdaaw by advertisement or sale — 
Perishable property or livestock. 
In proceeding under former section 9-1-6, 
relating to mortgagor's right to enjoin fore-
closure by advertisement and sale, court had 
Notice of disposition. 
Secured party is barred from obtaining a 
deficiency judgment after a disposition of the 
property securing the debt where no notice of 
the disposition was given the debtor and the 
disposition was not conducted in a commer-
cially reasonable manner. FMA Financial 
Corp. v. Pro-Printers (1979) 590 P 2d 803. 
Notice of sale. 
Secured party should give notice of time 
and place of sale of the collateral to a 
guarantor of the debt. Zions First Nat. Bank 
v. Hurst (1977) 570 P 2d 1031. 
Collateral References. 
Secured Transactions o=> 229 to 237, 240. 
79 CJS Supp. Secu:-d Transactions §§106 
to 113. 
69 AmJur 2d 499 'o 532, Secured Trans-
actions §§ 602 to 624. 
Rights and duties o: parties to conditional 
sales contract as to resale of repossessed 
property, 49 ALR 2d 15. 
Uniform Commercial Code; burden of proof 
as to commercially reasonable disposition of 
collateral, 59 ALR 3d 369. 
Uniform Commercial Code: failure of 
secured creditor to give required notice of 
disposition of collateral as bar to deficiency 
judgment, 59 ALR 3d 401. 
What constitutes a "public sale," 4 ALR 2d 
575. 
power, where it appeared that mortgaged 
property was perishable, or that it was live-
stock and that cost of feeding and keeping it 
pending action would be great, to call on 
mortgagor to consent to sale or furnish 
indemnity bond to hold mortgagee harmless. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
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Zum Btftnrnr^- 79 CJS Supp. Secured Transactions §§ 114, 
Secured party's liability for failure to com- uj>- . .
 9. ^ 2 t o 5 3 7 Secured T r a n s . )ly with part 5 of this chapter, 70A-9-507. *? A f / S L ^ ^ ' 
Secured party's right to dispose of collat- a c t l o n s §§ 6 2 5 t 0 627J 
,rai after default, 70A-9-504. Construction and operation of UCC § 9-505 
n n —-1 Reference*. M authorizing secured party in possession of 
CoU**r*l References collateral to retain it in satisfaction of obh-
Secured Transactions <S=» 238, 239.
 gation, 55 ALR 3d 651. 
70A-9-506, Debtor's right to redeem collateral. At any time before 
:he secured party has disposed of collateral or entered into a contract for 
ts disposition under section 70A-9-504 or before the obligation has been 
lischarged under section 70A-9-505 (2) the debtor or any other secured 
)arty may unless otherwise agreed in writing after default redeem the col-
ateral by tendering fulfillment of all obligations secured by the collateral 
ts well as the expenses reasonably incurred by the secured party in 
•etaking, holding and preparing the collateral for disposition, in arranging 
'or the sale, and to the extent provided in the agreement and not prohib-
ted by law, his reasonable attorney's fees and legal expenses. 
Hiftory: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 9-506. Collateral Reference*, 
;roee-Ref«rencee, S?f i2doT r M? c t i o i lJ T 2ih - , , , « 
' ' r i A- •*• * ii * i 79 CJS Supp. Secured Transactions § 118. 
Compulsory disposition of collateral,
 6 9 A m J u r 2d 550 to 559, Secured Trans-
°£ A - , ' • u* • j . / .. actions §J 639 to 648. 
Secured party s right to dispose of collat-
ral, 70A-9-504. 
70A-9-507, Secured party's liability for failure to comply with this 
>art. 
(1) If it is established that the secured party is not proceeding in 
accordance with the provisions of this part disposition may be 
ordered or restrained on appropriate terms and conditions. If the 
disposition has occurred the debtor or any person entitled to noti-
fication or whose security interest has been made known to the 
secured party prior to the disposition has a right to recover from 
the secured party any loss caused by a failure to comply with the 
provisions of this part. If the collateral is consumer goods, the 
debtor has a right to recover in any event an amount not less than 
the credit service charge plus ten per cent of the principal amount 
of the debt or the time price differential plus ten per cent of the 
cash price. 
(2) The fact that a better price could have been obtained by a sale at 
a different time or in a different method from that selected by the 
secured party is not of itself sufficient to establish that the sale 
was not made in a commercially reasonable manner. If the secured 
party either sells the collateral in the usual manner in any recog-
nized market therefor or if he sells at the price current in such 
market at the time of his sale or if he has otherwise sold in con-
formity with reasonable commercial practices among dealers in the 
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type of property sold he has sold in a commercially reasonable 
manner. The principles stated in the two preceding sentences with 
respect to sales also apply as may be appropriate to other types 
of disposition. A disposition which has been approved in any judi-
cial proceeding or by any bona fide creditors' committee or repre-
sentative of creditors shall conclusively be deemed to be 
commercially reasonable, but this sentence does not indicate that 
any such approval must be obtained in any case nor does it indicate 
that any disposition not so approved is not commercially reason-
able. 
collateral, where secured party failed to give 
debtor notice of the disposition and sold the 
collateral for a price equal to the balance due 
on the promissory note when the fair market 
value of the collateral was more than four 
times that amount. Maas v. Allred (1978) 577 
P 2d 127. 
Hiitory: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 9-507. 
Croat-Reference*. 
Obligation of good faith, 70A-1-203. 
Secured party's right to dispose of collat-
eral after default, 70A-9-504. 
Title to collateral immaterial, 70A-9-202. 
Deficiency judgment. 
Secured party is barred from obtaining a 
deficiency judgment after a disposition, pur-
suant to 70A-9-504, of the property securing 
the debt where no notice of the disposition 
was given the debtor and the disposition was 
not conducted in a commercially reasonable 
manner, FMA Financial Corp. v. Pro-
Printers (1979) 590 P 2d 803. 
Disposition not made in commercially 
reasonable manner. 
Secured party's disposition of the collat-
eral was not made in a commercially reason-
able manner, and secured party was liable to 
debtor for the value of debtor's equity in the 
Failure to give notice of sale of collateral 
Failure by secured party to give debtor 
notice of time and place of sale of the collat-
eral does not release debtor from his obli-
gation to pay any deficiency debt still exist-
ing after the sale; but debtor can recover for 
any loss caused by the failure to so notify. 
Zions First Nat. Bank v. Hurst (1977) 570 P 
2d 1031. 
Collateral References. 
Secured Transactions <£» 225, 242, 243. 
79 CJS Supp. Secured Transactions § 119. 
69 Arr.Jur 2d 559 to 567, Secured Trans-
actions $$647 to 653. 
Section 
70A-10-101. 
70A-10-102. 
70A-10-103. 
70A-10-104. 
CHAPTER 10 
EFFECTIVE DATE AND REPEALER 
Effective date. 
Specific repealer — Provision for transition. 
General repealer. 
Laws not repealed. 
70A-10-101. Effective date. This act shall become effective at midnight 
on December 31st, 1965. It applies to transactions entered into and events 
occurring after that date. 
History: L. 1966, ch. 154, § 10-101. 
70A-10-102. Specific repealer — Provision for transition. 
(1) The following acts and all other acts and parts of acts inconsistent 
herewith are hereby repealed: 
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act, Title 44, U.C.A., 1953; 
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the court otherwise orders. Notice of objections shall be submitted to the court 
and counsel within (5) days after service. 
(3) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall also be reduced to writing 
and presented to the court for signature within fifteen (15) days of the settle-
ment and dismissal. 
(4) Upon entry of judgment, notice of such judgment shall be served upon 
the opposing party and proof of such service shall be filed with the court. All 
judgments, orders, and decrees, or copies thereof, which are to be transmitted 
after signature by the judge, including other correspondence requiring a re-
ply, must be accompanied by pre-addressed envelopes and pre-paid postage. 
(5) All orders, judgments, and decrees shall be prepared in such a manner 
as to show whether they are entered upon the stipulation of counsel, the 
motion of counsel or upon the court's own initiative and shall identify the 
attorneys of record in the cause or proceeding in which the judgment, order or 
decree is made. 
(6) Except where otherwise ordered, all judgments and decrees shall con-
tain the address or the last known address of the judgment debtor and the 
social security number of the judgment debtor if known. 
(7) All judgments and decrees shall be prepared as separate documents and 
shall not include any matters by reference unless otherwise directed by the 
court. Orders not constituting judgments or decrees may be made a part of the 
documents containing the stipulation or motion upon which the order is 
based. 
(8) No orders, judgments, or decrees based upon stipulation shall be signed 
or entered unless the stipulation is in writing, signed by the attorneys of 
record for the respective parties and filed with the clerk or the stipulation was 
made on the record. 
(9) In all cases where judgment is rendered upon a written obligation to pay 
money and a judgment has previously been rendered upon the same written 
obligation, the plaintiff or plaintiffs counsel shall attach to the new com-
plaint a copy of all previous judgments based upon the same written obliga-
tion. 
Rule 4-505. Attorneys' fees affidavits. 
Intent: 
To establish uniform criteria and a uniform format for affidavits in support 
of attorneys' fees. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall govern the award of attorneys' fees in the trial courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Affidavits in support of an award of attorneys' fees must set forth specif-
ically the legal basis for the award, the nature of the work performed by the 
attorney, the number of hours spent to prosecute the claim to judgment, or the 
time spent in pursuing the matter to the stage for which attorneys' fees are 
claimed, and affirm the reasonableness of the fees for comparable legal ser-
vices. The affidavit must also separately state hours by persons other than 
attorneys, for time spent, work completed and hourly rate billed. 
(2) If the fee arrangement with the client is other than at an hourly rate an 
affidavit of the client or correspondence from the client shall be filed with the 
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court setting forth the terms and conditions of the arrangement, whether a 
flat rate or contingent fee, or the percentage of funds recovered or dealt with. 
(3) If judgment is being taken by default for a principal sum which it is 
expected will require considerable additional work to collect, the following 
phrase may be included in the judgment after an award consistent with the 
time spent to the point of default judgment, to cover additional fees incurred 
in pursuit of collection: 
"AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT THIS JUDGMENT 
SHALL BE AUGMENTED IN THE AMOUNT OF REASONABLE 
COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES EXPENDED IN COLLECTING 
SAID JUDGMENT BY EXECUTION OR OTHERWISE AS SHALL 
BE ESTABLISHED BY AFFIDAVIT." 
(4) Judgments for attorney's fees should not be awarded except as they 
conform to the provisions of this rule. 
Rule 4-506. Withdrawal of counsel in civil cases* 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure and criteria for withdrawal of counsel in 
civil cases. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all trial courts of record and not of record. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) An attorney may withdraw as counsel of record in all cases except where 
withdrawal would result in a delay of trial. In that case, an attorney may not 
withdraw without the approval of the court. 
(2) When an attorney withdraws as counsel of record, written notice of the 
withdrawal must be served upon the client of the withdrawing attorney and 
upon all other parties not in default and a certificate of service must be filed 
with the court. If a trial date has been set, the notice of withdrawal served 
upon the client shall include a notification of the trial date. 
(3) When an attorney dies or is removed or suspended or withdraws from 
the case or ceases to act as an attorney, opposing counsel must notify the 
unrepresented client of his/her responsibility to retain another attorney or 
appear in person before opposing counsel can initiate further proceedings 
against the client. 
Rule 4-507. Disposition of funds on trustee's sale. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for filing trustee affidavits of deposit and 
claimant petitions for adjudication of priority in trustee's sales. 
To establish a uniform procedure in determining the disposition of funds on 
trustee's sales. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all courts of record. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) At the time of depositing with the Clerk of the Court any proceeds from 
a trustee's sale in accordance with Utah Code Ann. Section 57-1-29, the 
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 PREFERRED VEHICLE LEASE AGREEMENT 
\ 
THIS AGREEMENT, made the 29th day oi December M±^ by and 
between ,
 m 
LMV LEASING, INC., 121 Freeport Road, Pittsburgh, PA 15238 
hereinafter called "Lessor" 
A 
N 
XHI« O 
MCQ^DBA/AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL CAR RENTAL 
1380 W. North Temple Street, Salt Lake City, UT 84116 
hereinaiter called "Lessee". 
WITNESSETH 
WHEREAS, Lessee contemplates the leasing oi various vehicles; and 
WHEREAS, Lessor is willing to lease said vehicles upon the terms and conditions hereinaiter 
set forth; 
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties hereto do mutually agree as follows* 
i. DEFINITIONS. As herein used* 
1.1 "Accounting Form" is a record with respect to a specific vehicle* Each 
Accounting Form will show the date of delivery of the vehicle, the make, 
manufacturer, model number, serial number, Agreed Price, Rental Payment, 
Base Lease Term in months, Interim Rental, Interim Lease Term, location and 
such other applicable details as Lessor and Lessee may desire. 
1.2 "Acquisition Fee- is a charge made by Lessor for procuring each vehicle. The 
amount and manner of payment are set forth in Schedule "A". 
1.3 "Administrative Fee19 is a monthly service charge payable by Lessee to Lessor; 
agreed upon between Lessor and Lessee as set forth in Schedule "A". 
l.» "Agreed Price* of any vehicle is determined as set forth in Schedule "A", 
1.5 "Base Lease Term-, with respect to any vehicle* is the period commencing on the 
15th day of the month following the month in which such vehicle is first 
delivered to Lessee and ending on the Uth day of the month identified in the 
Purchase Order ae the last month of the Base Lease Term. 
1.6 "Basic Rent", when used* combines and replaces Financing Charge11 and "Monthly 
Depreciation*, and, if used, is as set forth in Schedule "A". 
1.7 "book Value* of any vehicle is the Agreed Price less the aggreg*** Monthly 
1.1 "Bunded Rental" is a charge made by Lessor and payable by Lessee as set forth 
in Schedule "A* for continuing to lease any vehicle beyond the Base Lease Term 
theroi. 
1.9 "Financing Charge* is a component of the monthly Rental Payment determined 
as set forth in Schedule "A", 
1.10 "Interim Lease Term", with respect to any vehicle, is (a) in the case of delivery 
by the manufacturer, the period commencing on the 10th day following the 
shipping date (as set forth in the manufacturer's invoice, a copy of which shall be 
delivered to Lessee) of such vehicle by the manufacturer thereof and, in the case 
of delivery by anyone other than the manufacturer, commencing on the date of 
delivery of such vehicle to Lessee and ending, in each case, on the 
common tnt of tht Bait Ltaat Term fo: uch vehicle (tht "Initial 
Interim Ltaat Term") plot (b) tht period, if tnyf commencing on tht 
day on which Lttttt rtturnt auch vthiclt to Ltttor in conntctlon vith 
Leeeee'e cxerclee of any option to terminate tht ltaat of auch 
vehicle prior to tht regularly achtdult expiration of tht Baat Ltaat 
Tent thtrtof (provided that on auch day Ltaatt ptya to Ltaaor tht 
monthly ttntal Payment dut on auch data, if any), and andlng on tht 
day cm vhich Ltttor thai I have rtctlvtd tht ntt procttda of aala of 
emefc vthiclt togtthtr with tny ttmlnatlon payment dua undtr Stction 
19 from Ltaatt vith rtaptct to auch aala tht ("Second Inttrla Ltaat 
Term"). 
1.11 "Interim Ranta1" la tht amount payablt by Laaatt to Laaaor vith 
rtaptct to tht ltaat of any vahiclt during tht Inttrim Ltaat Term 
thtrtof and ahall bt tqual to tha Financing Charge multiplied by tht 
unamortized balanct of tht Agrttd Price, computed on tht baaia of a 
360-day ytar and tvtlvt 30-day montha, for tht actual numbtr of days 
involved. 
1.12 "Monthly Depreciation1' for any vehicle la that portion of the monthly 
Rental Payment vhich la used to red ce the Agreed Price to Book 
Value. 
1.13 "Overall Leaae Term" vith reapect to any vehicle la the period 
conalatlng of the Interim Leaae Term and the Baae Leaae Term thereof; 
provided, hovever, that it alao lncludea any other period, whether 
prior to the Interim Leaae Term or the aubaequent to the expiration 
or other termination of the 3M$9 Leaae Term or the Interim Leaae 
Term, aa the caae may be, during vhich Leaaee haa poaaeeaion of auch 
vehicle (including any period contemplated by Section 3.4. 
1.14 "Purchaae Order" la a form aupplled or approved by Leaaor and algned 
(or electronically entered) by Leaaee that speciflea the Leaaee'a 
preference aa to delivery area, date of delivery, vehicle to be 
furnished, the make, manufacturer, model number, color, acceeaorlee, 
optional iteme and any other featurea to bt furniahed and the number 
of montha in tht Baae Leaae Term. 
1.15 "ttntal Payment11 ia tht amount payable by Leaaee to Leaaor each month 
for the uae of a specific vehicle during the Bapp Leaae Term thereof 
and conalata of, but la not neceaaarily limited tot 
Monthly Depreciation (1.12 above) Baalc tent (1.6 above) 
Financing Charge (1.9 above) Maintenance (6 belov) 
Admlniatratlve Fee (1.3 above) Taxea and Feea (7 belov) 
1.16. "Settlement Fee19 la. a charge made by Leeeor at termination of the 
leaae of each vehicle at aet forth in Schedule "A". 
1.17 "Termination Value", vith reapect to any vehicle, ia the amount 
determined in accordance vith Bxhlbit "I" and payable pursuant to 
Section 19. 
1.1ft "Vehicle19 meant ont or mort automoblltt, vane, trucka or similar 
item*. 
> •. - -
2.1 Leeeor hereby leaaee to Leaaee, and the Leeeee hereby leaaee from 
Leeeor, the vehlclee deecribed in Accounting Forme delivered and/or 
to be delivered upon the terme and conditlone aet forth in thla 
Agreement, ae aupplamented vith reapect to each vehicle by the terma 
and conditlone aet forth in the appropriate Accounting Fore 
identifying auch vehicle. 
2.2 The vehlclee to be leaaed hereunder ahall be thoae identified an< 
apecified in Purchaae Orders placed by Leeeee vith Leaaor from tiai 
to time and vhich Leaaor undertakee to have delivered to Leaaee. Ii 
the event the ueual supplier of any particular vehicle la unable t< 
provide the aame In time to meet the delivery date apecified b 
Leeeee, Leeeor and Leaaee ahall agree on eubetituted action 
~- *
w
- otreumatance. Upon delivery of any vehicle 
deliver to Ussor a dalivtry rtctipt signed by tha individual to whom dalivtry is 
authorizad "by Usstt* Upon dalivtry of a vehidt to Lessee, Ussor and Ltssea 
shall execute an Accounting Form with rtsptct to such vehicle. Except as 
spaciiicaily modiiiad with rtsptct to any vahicia by tha ttrms and conditions sat 
forth in tha appropriate Accounting Form idantifying such vehicle, all of tha 
ttrms and conditions of this Agrttmtnt shall govarn tha rights and obligations of 
Ltssor and Lessee. Whatavar rtftrtnct is mada to "this Agrttmtnt11 it shall ba 
dttmtd to include, as required, tha ona or mora Accounting Forms idantifying 
tha vahicia. 
2.3 Each vahicia shall at all timas ba tha sola and axdusivt proptrty of Ltssor, and 
Ltssaa shall hava no right, titla or inttrtst tharain txctpt tha right to use tha 
samt as htrtin provided. As long as Ltssaa is not in dafault in any obligation to 
Lessor, Lassaa may use tha vehicles in tha rtgular course of its business (or any 
lawful purpose. 
3. TERM 
3.1 Tha Base Lease Term with respect to any vehicle is set forth in the Accounting 
Form relating thereto. 
3.2 This Agreement shall remain in effect until such time as no further vehicles are 
subject hereto and until Lessee has satisfied in full all of its obligations to Lessor 
with respect to any vehicle at any time leased hereunder. Provided that no 
Event of Default shall have occurred and ba continuing, tha termination of this 
Agreement in respect of any vehicle shall not affect any other vehicle subject 
hereto at the time of such termination and any such other vehicle shall remain 
subject to the terms of this Agreement and tha appropriata Accounting Form 
idantifying such other vehicle. 
3.3 Lessee may retire from service any vehicle leased pursuant to this Agreement by 
giving to Lessor written notice and surrendering possession of such vehicle to 
Lessor at tha point where samt was originally delivered to Lessee, or at such 
other point as may ba mutually agreed upon. Tha iaese ae to such vahicia shall 
terminate upon the data such vehicle is sold by Leseor pursuant to Section 19, 
subject, however, to tha provisions hereof including, but not limited to, Sections 
16 and 19. 
3.* At Lessee's option any vehicle may ba continuad in sarvica beyond the Base 
Lease Term thereof, in which event (a) tha monthly rental due therefor during 
such continuation will ba tha Extended Rental and (b) no Interim Rental will ba 
payabla with respect to any Second Interim Leasa Term ol such vehicle. 
t . RENTAL PAYMENTS 
4.1 Lessee agrees to pay Leseor, as rent tor each vahicia leased hereunder, Interim 
Rental and monthly Rental Payments, and any other charges due, during each 
taaMh o i tha Overall Lease Term with respect to such vehicle in such amounts as 
mm sat fort* In tha Accounting Form relating to such vahicia and are calculated 
(UKordance with methods o! computation sat forth in Schedule "A9. With 
rSpdct to each vehicle, all rent and other charges shall ba due and payabla on or 
befora tha fifteenth (15th) day of each month during tha Overall Leasa Term 
thereof, commencing with the first such fifteenth 113th) day after tha 
commencement of the Interim Leasa Term with respect to such vehicle. A 
LATE CHARGE OF 2% OF THE AMOUNT DUE WITH A MINIMUM CHARGE OF 
32.00 WILL BE ADDED TO EACH SUCH PAYMENT UNPAID ON THE DUE 
DATE AND THE SAME CHARGE WILL BE AODED FOR EACH SUBSEQUENT 
MONTH OR PART THEREOF ON WHICH SUCH PAYMENT REMAINS UNPAID. 
-3-
t.2 With respect to any vehicle returned to Lessor pursuant to Section 3.3, monthly 
Rental Payments snail cease on the day alter the return date. 
4.3 Interim Rdntai and monthly Rental Payments shell be paid to Ussor *t the 
address set forth above or such other address as Ussor shall provide to Lessee. 
>. WARRANTIES. 
LESSOR, NOT BEING THE MANUFACTURER OR A DISTRIBUTOR OF THE 
VEHICLES NOR THE MANUFACTURER'S OR A DISTRIBUTOR'S AGENT, MAKES NO 
EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTY OR REPRESENTATION OF ANY KINO WHATSOEVER 
WITH RESPECT TO ANY VEHICLE, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TOt THE 
MERCHANTABILITY OF THE VEHICLE OR ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR 
PURPOSE) THE DESIGN OR CONDITION OF THE VEHICLE) THE QUALITY OR CAPACITY 
OF THE VEHICLE) THE WORKMANSHIP IN THE VEHICLE) COMPLIANCE OF THE 
VEHICLE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF ANY LAW, RULE, SPECIFICATION OR 
CONTRACT PERTAINING THERETO) PATENT INFRINGEMENT) IT BEING AGREED THAT 
THE VEHICLES ARE LEASEO "AS IS". WITHOUT LIMITING THE GENERALITY OF THE 
FOREGOING, LESSOR SHALL NOT BE LIABLE FOR ANY DEFECTS, EITHER LATENT OR 
PATENT IN ANY VEHICLE, OR FOR ANY DIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGE 
THEREFROM, OR FOR ANY LOSS OF USE THEROF OR FOR ANY INTERRUPTION IN 
LESSEE'S BUSINESS BY ITS INABILITY TO USE ANY VEHICLE FOR ANY REASON 
WHATSOEVER. Lessee will be subrogated to Lessor's claims, if any, against the 
manuiacturer or supplier of any vehicle for breach oi any warranty or representation, by 
such manufacturers or suppliers and, upon written request from Lessee, Lessor shall take all 
reasonable action requested by Lessee to enforce any such warranty, express or implied, 
issued on or applicable to any vehicle which is enforceable by Ussor in its own name, 
provided, however, that (a) no Event of Default has occurred and (b) Ussor shall not be 
obligated to take any action to enforce any such warranty unless Lessee shall pay ail 
expenses in connection therewith. Upon request by Ussor, Lessee shall pay Ussor's 
reasonably estimated costs in advance. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Lessee's obligations 
to pay the Interim Rental, monthly Rental Payments and other charges under this 
Agreement shall be and are absolute and unconditional. All proceeds of any such warranty 
recovered from the manufacturer or supplier of a vehicle shall first be used to repair the 
affected vehicle. 
6. MAINTENANCE, REPAIRS, OPERATING EXPENSES AND RETURN OF VEHICLES. 
6.1 Unless otherwise specified in a schedule hereto separately signed by Lessor, 
Lessee will pay for all maintenance and repairs to keep the vehicles in good 
working order and condition and any other expenses associated with operating 
the vehicles* Leasee will service the vehicles according to the manufacturers' 
recommendations as outlined in the owner's manual and the maintenance 
schedule folder accompanying each vehicle. 
6^ 2 Lessee will return each vehicle at the end of the lease thereof in good condition 
with no excessive wear and tear including, among other things* (1) no glass 
breakage or discoloration, (2) no damage or deterioration of body, fenders, metal 
work, trim or paint, (3) no original equipment including wheel covers or tires 
(including spare) that are missing or not in safe condition, (6) no damage from 
flood water, hail, or sand, and (7) no damage or alteration that makes the vehicle 
either unsafe or unlawful to operate. 
6.3 Lessee shall comply with any and all governmental requirements affecting th« 
maintenance, operation or use of each of the vehicles including, without 
limitation, any changes or safeguards therein to keep each of the vehicles in suet 
compliance. Any replacement parts, changes in or improvements to each of th< 
vehicles shall become and remain the property of Lessor. 
REGBTRATIONi TAXES AND INSPECTION. 
responsible for payment for titling, registration and licensing and ail 
"vetftdes required by any govtrnmtnt authority during the overall lease 
pay for all excise, sale, viae, personal property, gross receipts, and other 
assessed by federal, state or local governments, during the Overall Lease 
Term whether with respect to this Agreement or the ownership, lease, use or operation of 
the vehicle, or with respect to the receipt of rental and other payments by Lessor, except 
those taxes levied on the net income of the Lessor, provided that the foregoing exception 
shall not apply to any such net income taxes which are in substitution for, or relieve the 
Lessee from the payment of, taxes which it would otherwise be obligated to pay or 
reimburse. Lessee shall comply with all federal, state, county and municipal statutes, 
ordinances, rules, and regulations which may be applicable to the leasing, use, insuring, 
condition, maintenance or operation of the vehicles hereunder, and shall prepare and furnish 
to Lessor ail documents, returns, or forms legally required thereunder. Lessee shall provide 
all drivers or other operators of the vehicles and shall be soiey responsible for any and all 
fines, penalties and forfeitures (including, without limitation, the confiscation of any of the 
vehicles) arising out of or due to the use, operation, condition, maintenance or insuring of 
each of the vehicles in violation of any law, regulation, statute or similar requirement of 
any governmental authority* 
8- DELIVERY 
5.1 Lessor will not be responsible for any loss resulting ffrom delay in delivery of any 
vehicle. 
8.2 Lessee hereby warrants to Lessor that any person accepting delivery of any 
vehicle has authority to do so on behalf of Lessee and that the signature of such 
person on any document executed in connection herewith shall be binding on 
Lessee. 
9. USE. 
9.1 Lessee will allow only licensed drivers to operate the vehicles and Lessee agrees 
that Lessee (if a natural person) and all such licensed drivers are drivers in good 
standing under the laws of the state in which they are licensed and have not 
within the past five (J) years had any driver's license suspended or revoked or had 
any insurance premium adjusted because of a poor driving record. 
9.2 Lessee will keep the vehicles free of all fines, liens and encumbrances. If Lessor 
receives notice of any motor vehicle violation relating to any vehicle, Lessor 
may charge Lessee a reasonable service charge, as determined by Lessor from 
time to time, for processing such notice. Nothing in this Section 9.2 shall 
require Lessor, however, to take any action with respect to such notice. 
9.3 lessee will not use the vehicles illegally, improperly or for hire, or permit such 
9«* Leesee will not use the vehicles to pull trailers unless designed for that purpose. 
9 3 Loose*, will not remove the vehicles from the continental United States. 
9.6 Lessee will not alter, mark or install equipment in the vehicles without Lessor's 
written consent. 
9.7 Lessee will not change the locations at which the vehicles are permanently 
garaged without prior notification to Lessor of such relocation. 
10. OWNERSHIP. 
10.1 This Agreement is a lease only and Lessor remains the owner of the vehicle* 
This Agreement is a net lease and Lessee shall not be entitled to any abatement 
of Interim Rentals, Rental Payments or other amounts payable hereunder or 
reduction thereof, including, but not limited to, abatements or reductions due to 
any present or future claims of Lessee against Lessor under this Agreement or 
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otherwise, or against the manufacturer or vendor of the vehicles nor, except as 
otherwise expressly provided herein, shall this Agreement terminate, or the 
respective obligations of Lessor or Lessee be otherwise affected, by reason of 
any defect in.or damage to or loss or destruction of all or any of the vehicles 
from whatsoever cause, the taking or requisitioning of all or any vehicles by 
condemnation or otherwise, the prohibition by law of Lessee's use of ail or any 
vehicles, the interference with such use by any private person or corporation, the 
invalidity or unenforceability or lack of due authorization or other infirmity of 
this Agreement, or lack of right, power or authority of Lessor to enter into this 
Agreement, or for any other cause whether similar or dissimilar to the foregoing, 
any present or future law to the contrary notwithstanding, it being the intention 
of the parties hereto that the rents and other amounts payable by Lessee 
hereunder shall continue to be payable in all events unless the obligation to pay 
the same shall be terminated pursuant to the terms hereof. 
10.2 Lessee will not transfer, sublease, or rent any of the vehicles or do anything to 
interfere with Lessor's ownership of the vehicles. Lessee agrees that this Lease 
will be treated as a true lease for federal income tax purposes and that unless 
there is a written agreement with Lessor to the contrary, Lessor viM receive all1' 
of the tax and other benefits of ownership of the vehicles ana* Lessee will not 
claim any depreciation or ACRS deductions or investment tax credits with 
respect to the vehicles. Lessee will, from time to time, execute such statements 
as may be requested by Lessor in order to confirm Lessor's ownership of the 
vehicles and Lessor's right to claim such tax benefits with respect thereto. • 
11. RISK OP LOSS AND INSURANCE. 
All risks of loss from public liability, damage to property or third persons, or damage 
to each vehicle, whether caused by an unavoidable casualty, accident, abuse or misuse 
thereof by Lessee, its employees, agents or others, shall be borne by Lessee. Lessee shall 
ee«efeehe«e<i«e»eji4>aee«lieie«^4MMeeaf» with a responsible qualified insurance company 
acceptable to Lessor, protecting the interests of Lessor and Lessee against liability tor 
damages for personal injury or death, property damage to others, or damage to the vehicles 
wherever such vehicles may be used or be located, ail as set forth in Schedule "A". Said 
insurance shall not be excess over other coverage, but shall be primary insurance up to and 
including the limits set forth in Schedule"A». Said insurance policies shall be satisfactory to 
Lessor as to form and substance, shall be payable to Lessor or its assigns as their interests 
may appear and shall name Lessor as an additional named insured without liability for 
premiums. Said policies shall provide for at least ten (10) days written notice of 
cancellation to Lessor or it* assigns and Lessee shall furnish certificates, policies o» 
endorsements to Lessor or any such assigns as proof of such insurance. Lessor or its assign 
may act aa attorney for Lessee in making, adjusting or settling any claims under an] 
insurance) policies insuring the vehicles. Lessee assigns to Lessor all of its right, title, ant 
interest to ai*y insurance policies insuring the vehicles, including all rights to receive ttv 
proceeds of Insurance not in excess of the unpaid obligations under this Lease, and direct 
any insurer to pay ail such proceeds directly to Lessor or its assigns and authorizes Lessor o 
its assigns to endorse Lessee's name on any draft for such proceeds. No such loss, damagi 
theft or eaaeruction of any vehicle* in whole or part, shall Impair the obligations of Lesss 
under that Agreement, ail of wMch shall continue at full force and effect subject to Lessee 
right to terminate} the lease of any vehicle pursuant to Section 3.3. After compliance wii 
the foregoing to Lessor's satisfaction, and provided no Event of Default has occurred and 
continuing, Lessee shall be subrogated to Lessor's rights with respect to any insurant 
policies or claims for reimbursement by others with respect to such loss. 
12* GENUAL INDEMNITY. 
Lessee assumes liability for and hereby agrees to indamnify, protactf and save and 
kaap harmless Lassorf its afants* servants, succassors and assigns from and against all 
ciaimst whether or not dua in whola or in part to any act or omission or othar negligence of 
Lassor, its agents, servants, successors, assigns or any of thair ampioyeasf for losses, 
damagast injuries, costs, expenses, attorneys1 faas and court costs arising out of tha usaf 
condition (including, but not limitad to9 latant and othar defects, whathar or not 
discovarabla by it), or operation of any vehicle, ragardlass of whara, how and by whom 
operated or arising out of or resulting from tha condition of tha vehicles sold or disposed of 
after use by Lessee or, if Lessee shall not take delivery of any vehicle hereunder, after 
Lessee shall have signed (or electronically entered) a Purchase Order with respect to such 
vehicle arising out of or resulting from any claims that the manufacturer or supplier of such 
vehicle may assert against Lessor with respect to such Purchase Order • Lessee shall 
assume the settlement of, and the defense of any suit or suits, or other legal proceedings 
brought to enforce all such losses, damages, injuries, claims, demands and expenses, and 
shall pay all judgments entered in any such suit or suits or other legal proceedings. The 
indemnities and assumptions of liabilities and obligations herein provided for shall continue 
in full force and effect from and after the date of Lessee's execution of this Agreement, 
notwithstanding the subsequent termination hereof by expiration of time, by operation of 
law, or otherwise* Lessee shall indemnify, protect and save and keep harmless Lessor, its 
agents, servants, successors and assigns from and against all liability arising under Title IV 
of the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Saving Act, P.U 92-313, and similar laws of any 
other jurisdiction relating to false or inaccurate odometer readings* Lessee hereby 
represents and warrants that this Agreement constitutes a "qualified motor vehicle 
operating agreement*, as defined in Section 161 (f) (13) of the Internal Revenue Code, and 
shall indemnify Lessor in the event of the incorrectness of such representation and warranty 
pursuant to this Section 12. Lessee is an independent contractor and nothing contained in 
the Agreement shall authorize Lessee or any other person to operate any vehicle so as to 
incur or impose any liability or obligation for or on behalf of Lessor* 
13. ASSIGNMENT AND SUBLEASE BY LESSEE* CHANGE IN CONTROL. 
13.1 Without Lessor's prior written consent. Lessee may not, by operation or law or 
otherwise; (a) assign, transfer, pledge} hypothecate or otherwise dispose of this 
Agreement orany invest therein or (b) sublet or lend the vehicles or permit the 
same to be used by anyone'other than Lessee or Lessee's employees, except that, 
following written notice to Lessor, it may sublet the same to any of its present 
or future subsidiaries or affiliated companies, but every such sublease shall be 
subject and subordinate to the terms of this Agreement and shall in no event 
relieve Leasee ot its obligations hereunder, and each such sublessee shall, in 
addition, agree in writing with Lessor at the time of the sublease to be bound by 
the terms and conditions hereof • 
13.2 t ^ i n j ! * change in control of Lssaea, such change in control shall be deemed 
^ ^ ^ K S t o a t e of this Agreement for purposes of Section 13.1. In addition to 
^ ^ ^ r o a l change ol control, a change in control shall be deemed to occurred if, 
OTB| time, the ownership ol more than 30 percent of either the voting power of 
* fefcei the equity interests in Lessee is different than on the date hereof. 
U . ASSIGNMENT BY LESSOR. 
For the purpose of providing funds for financing the purchase of vehicles to be leased 
hereunder, or for any other purpose, Lessor may assign to any third party all or any part of 
its right, title and interest in and to this Agreement and in and to the vehicles and monies 
due and to become due to the Lessor hereunder. In such event all the provisions of this 
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Agrttmtnt lor tht btntfit of Ltssor shallf to tht txttnt of tht rights assigntd, inert to tht 
btntf it ol and may, to such txttnt, bt txtrcistd by or on bthtlf of such third party, and ail 
rtntal paymtnu and othtr amounts dut and to btcomt dut undtr this Agrttmtnt and 
assigntd to such third party, upon notict by Ltssor or assigntt to Ltsstt, shall bt paid 
dirtctly to such third party, and THE RIGHT* OP SUCH ASSIGNEE SHALL NOT BE 
SUBJECT TO ANY DEFENSE, COUNTERCLAIM OR SET-OFF WHICH LESSEE MAY HAVE 
AGAINST LESSOR, for any claim of tht Ltsstt whatsoavtr; whtthtr arising from brtach of 
warranty or rtprtstmation relating to any vthidt, or arising from tht ttrmination of this 
Agrttmtnt or of any ltast of any vthiclt htrtundtr, or arising from tht brtach or failure of 
Ltssor to obstrvt or ptrform any of tht ttrms or provisions of this Agrttmtnt or of any 
othtr agrttmtnt or transaction whatsoavtr bttwttn Ltssor and tht Ltsstt. Ltsstt agrees 
to makt prompt payment to such third party of tht rentals and othtr amounts so assigntd 
even though bankruptcy, reorganization, arrangemtnt, insolvency, liquidation or dissolution 
proceedings are instituted by or against tht Ltssor and regardless of whtthtr a trustee or 
receiver in any such proceedings shall assume or reject this Agretmtnt. In tht tvent of such 
assignment, tht liability of Ltsstt to pay such third party tht full amount of tht rental and 
othtr sums assigntd with respect to each vehicle htrtundtr shall not bt terminated, 
notwithstanding anything her tin containtd to tht contrary, unites (1) Ltsstt shall have paid 
such third party all assigntd sums dut htrtundtr with rtsptct to such vthiclt or (2) such 
third party or Ltssor shall have furnished to Ltsstt a releast executed by such third party 
in substantially tht following forms 
"The vthiclt herein dtscribtd has been rtltastd from tht assignment madt by 
LMV LEASING, INC, to tht undtrsigntd". (Signature of third party or 
authorized offictr to bt addtd.) 
Such third party shall have no obligation or liabilities undtr this Agrttmtnt by rtason of or 
arising out of such assignment, nor shall such third party bt required or obligated in any 
manner to ptrform or fulfill any dutits or obligations of tht Ltssor undtr this Agreement* 
15. LESSOR'S PERFORMANCE OF LESSEE OBLIGATIONS 
If Ltsstt shall fail to duly and promptly ptrform any of its obligations undtr this 
Agrttmtnt with rtsptct to any vthiclt, Ltssor may (at its option) ptrform any act or make 
any payment which Lessor dttma ntctssary for tht mainttnanct and prtstrvation of sudi 
vthiclt and Ltssor4* titit thereto, including paymtnu for satisfaction of liens, repairs, 
taxes, ltvies and insuranca and all sums so paid or incurred by Ltssor, togtthtr with inttresi 
at tht maximum rata ptrmitttd by law from tht data of paymtnt, and any reasonable lega 
feta incurred by Ltssor in connection therewith shall bt additional amounts dut undtr thi* 
Agirttmtnt and payablt by Ltsstt to Ltssor on demand* Tht ptrformanca of any act o 
paymtnt by Ltssor as afortsaid shall not bt detmtd a waiver or rtitast of any obligation o 
dtf auit on tht part of Lente. 
16. TAXMXENMTY. 
ThitStctioft J6 applias unltsa othtrwist sptcilitd in Exhibit "P. 
16.1 i i U) for any rtason othtr than a Law Changt (aa hartinafttr dtfintd) Lessor 
not entitled to claim or shall have reduced or disallowed all or any portion of tt 
investment tax credit or tht dtprtciation or ACRS daductions dtscribtd 
Exhibit T ("Tax Btntfits") or any such Tax Btntf its art recaptured or defer n 
in whol* or in part pursuant to tht Internal Revenue Code of 1934, as amended 
"Tax Btntfits Loss49) or (b) thart occurs a Law Changt that would rtsult in 
reduction of Lessor's altar-tax yitid from tht teasing of any vthiclt htrtundtr 
"Law Changt Loss19), than Lessee shall pay to Lessor as additional rent su 
amount as, after deduction of ail taxts required to bt paid by Ltssor in rtsp* 
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of tht receipt thtreof undtr tht laws of any govtrnmtntti or taxing authority in 
tht Unittd Statts. ihaii bt required to causa Lessor's not rtturn and cash flow to 
equal tht ntt retuw and cash flow that would havt bttn availablt to Lessor if it 
(i) Lessor had bttn tntitltd to tht utilization oi tht Tax Btntfits or (ii) such Law 
Changt had not occurred (in either cast, tht "Tax Indemnity Amount"), For 
purposes hereof, "Law Change11 means any amendment of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1934 that is enacted alter the date on which the Overall Lease Term 
commences as to a particular vehicle* 
16.2 Lessor shall be responsible forf and shall not be entitled to a payment *y Lessee 
on account of, any Tax Benefits Loss arising solely as a direct result of the 
occurrence of any one or more of the following events* (i) the failure of Lessor 
to timely and properly claim Tax Benefits (unless tax counsel to Lessor shall 
have advised it that such Tax Benefits cannot properly be claimed for any 
vehicle on the tax return of Lessor (or the consolidated Federal taxpayer group 
of which Lessor is a part); or (ii) the failure of Lessor (or the consolidated 
Federal taxpayer group of which Lessor is a part) to have sufficient taxable 
income before depreciation or ACR5 deductions with respect to the vehicles to 
offset tht full amount of any such depreciation or ACRS deduction or to have 
sufficient tax liability to utilize the investment tax credit with respect to the 
vehicles. 
16.3 Lessor promptly shall notify Lessee in writing of any Tax Benefits Loss or Law 
Change Loss and of tht Tax Indemnity Amount relating thereto and Lessee shall 
pay to Lessor such Tax Indemnity Amount wttfiin thirty (30) days of such notice. 
For purposes of this Stction 16f a Tax OtfwOTtf Loss shall occur upon the earliest 
of (i) tht happening ol any event (such at a changt in get ot any vehicle or a 
disposition of a vehicle by Lessor after Lessee has terminated tht lease oi such 
vehicle before tht end of tht Bast Lease Term thtrtoft which may cause such 
Tax Benefits Loss} (ii) the payment by Lessor (or the consolidated Federal 
taxpayer group of which Lessor is a part) to tht Internal Revenue Service or a 
state or local taxing authority of tht tax increase resulting from such Tax 
Benefits Loss} or (Ui) tht adjustment of the tax return of Lessor (or the 
consolidated Federal taxpayer group of which Lessor is a part) by an examining 
agent to reflect such Tax benefits Loss; for purposes hereof» a Law Change Loss 
shall occur upon tht effective date of such Law Change* 
16.* Notwithstanding tht foregoing, following tht salt or othtr disposition of a 
vehicle by Leeeor, if no Tax Benefits Lose has previously occurred with respect 
to such vthidtt a Tax Benefits Loos shall (unless Lessee shell have paid in full 
tht Termination Value of such vehicle pursuant to Stction 19) bt deemed to havt 
resulted iftd tht Tax indemnity Amount with respect thereto shall bt that 
amount determined by multiplying tht factor set forth on Exhibit T by the 
16.5 LteettS obligations undtr this Stction shall survive the termination of this 
Agrytmtnt* 
17. eVQQJjOr DEFAULT. 
Less** diall bt in default under this Agreement with respect to all vehicles acquired 
hereunder upen the happening oi any of the following events or conditions ("Events of 
Default")} 
17.1 Default by Lessee in payment ol any Interim Rental or Rental Payment or any 
other indebtedness or obligation now or hereafter owed by Lessee to Lessor 
under this Agreement or otherwise} 
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17J Deiault In the performance of any obligation, covenant or liability contained in 
this Agreement or any other agreement or document with Lessor, and the 
continuance of such default for ten (10) consecutive days after written notice 
thereof by Lessor to Lessee; 
17J Any warranty, representation or statement made or furnished to Lessor by or on 
behalf of Lessee or any permitted sublessee proves to have been false in any 
material respect when made or furnished) 
17.* Loss, theft, damage, or destruction of any vehicle not covered by insurance or 
the attempted sale or encumbrance by Lessee of any vehicle, or the making of 
any levy, seizure or attachment thereof or thereon; 
17.3 Dissolution, termination of existence, discontinuance of its business, insolvency, 
business failure, or appointment of a receiver of any part of the property of, or 
assignment for the benefit of creditors by, Lessee or any permitted sublessee or 
the commencement of any proceedings under any insolvency, bankruptcy, 
reorganization or arrangement laws by or against Lessee or any permitted 
sublessee; or 
17.6 Lessee or any permitted sublessee shall fail generally to pay its debts as they 
become due, or shall take any corporate action in furtherance of any Event of 
Default. 
Anything to the contrary contained in the preceding provisions of this Section 17 
notwithstanding, in the event that the Lessor shall have assigned to one or more, third 
parties all or any part of its right, title and interest hereunder, each such third party shall, 
to the extent of the rights assigned to itf have the right to determine whether the happening 
of any of the foregoing events or conditions (a) with respect to any Interim Rentals of 
Rental Payments or other payment not assigned to such third party, or (b) with respect to 
any of the Lessee's obligations, covenants, liabilities, representations and warranties 
regarding any vehicle, rights to which have not been assigned to such third party, shall 
constitute Events of Default for purposes of such third party's rights in and to trus 
Agreement* 
In the event of an affirmative election in writing by any such third party to treat an 
event or condition described in the preceding clause (a) or clause (b) as an Event of Default, 
for purposes of such third party* rights hereunder, such third party shall, to the extent of 
the rights assigned to it, be entitled to exercise the remedies provided for in Section 14* 
Absent such an affirmative election by such third party, (i) the rights assigned to such third 
party shall be deemed, for purposes of this Section 17, to arise under a separate lease 
agreement and (ii) there shall not be any cross-default between such deemed separate lease 
agreement and this Agreement. 
it* Bpyfrart **» *««no 
nee of any Event ol Default and at any time thereafter: 
Hneiy without any further notice exercise one or more of tht foUowini 
as Lessor in its tote discretion snail elects (a) declare all unpaid rental 
this Agreement (discounted* however, to their then present value at 
rate ol 4% per annum) to be immediately due and payable} (b) terminat 
this Agreement as to any or all vehicles) (c) take possession ol the vehicls 
wherever found, and for this purpose enter upon any premises ol Lessee or an 
other person and remove the vehicles, without liability for suit, action or oth< 
proceeding by the Lessee or any person acting by, for or under Lessee, ar 
remove the same* (d) cause Lessee at its expense promptly to return the vehicl* 
to Lessor in the condition set forth in Section 6.2: (e) use, hold, sell, repair, lea 
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or otherwise disposo of tho vohidos on tho promisos of Lessee or any othor 
location without affocting tho obligations of Lessee as provided in this 
Agreement (f) soU or loaso tho vohidos at public auction or by privato sate or 
loaso at such timo or timos and upon such torms as Lossor may determine, frto 
and cloar of any rights of Lassoo andt if notico thoroof is required by law, any 
notico in writing of any such sate or teaso by Lossor to Ussoo not lass than tan 
(10) days prior to tho data thoroof shall constituto roasonabte notico thortof to 
Lossoot (g) procood by appropriato action oithor at law or in equity to enforce 
porformanco by Lassoo of tho applicabte covonants of this Agrtomont or to 
racovor damagos for tho broach thoroof} and (h) oxorciso any and ail rights 
accruing to a lossor undor any applicabte law upon a dofault by a lassoo. 
18.2 In addition, Lossor shall bo omitted to rocovor immodiataly as liquidated 
damagost and not as a penalty, a sum oqual to tho aggregate of the following: (a) 
all unpaid rentals or othor sums which are duo and payable hereunder up to the 
date of redelivery to, or repossession by, Lessor; (b) any expenses paid or 
incurred by Lessor in connection with exercising any of its remedies under 
Soction IS*It including attorneys1 fees, legal expanses and court costs; (c) all 
unpaid rentals due and to become due undor this Agreement for any vehicle 
which Lessee fails to return to Lessor as provided above or converts or destroys, 
or which Lessor is unable to repossess; (dj tho Tax Indemnity Amount (if Section 
16 applies)! and (o) an amount equal to tho difference between U) all unpaid 
rentals for any vehicle returned to or repossessed by Lessor from Mm data 
thereof to tho end of tho term therefor piua tho expected Termination VUua (if 
any) of such vehicle at the end of tho term therefor, and (10 tho whotesafil vaiud 
of each such vehicle on such date, provided, however, that the value of each 
vehicle shall not exceed tho proceeds of any sate thereof by Lessor. Should 
Lessor, however, estimate its actual damages to exceed the foregoing, Lessor 
may, at its option, recover its actual damages ift-lieu thereof or in addition 
thereto* Lessor shall not bo obligated to sell, loaso br otherwise dispose of any 
vehicle hereunder if it would impair the sale, loaso or other disposition of other 
vehicles in tho ordinary course of Lessor's business or vehicles which were 
previously repossessed by Lessor from any party. 
15.3 None of tho remedies undor this Agreement are intended to bo exclusive, but 
each shall bo cumulative and In addition to any othor remedy referred to herein 
or otherwise available to Lossor at law or in equity and tho third party election 
set forth in tho penultimate paragraph of Section 17 shall bo exercisable so long 
as tho Events and Default described in clause (a) or (b) of said paragraph are 
continuing. Any repossession or subsequent sate or loaso by Lessor of any vehicle 
shall not bar an action for a deficiency as herein provided, and tho bringing of an 
action or tho entry of judgment against tho Lassoo shall not bar the Lessor's 
right to repossess any or all vehicles* LESSEE WAIVES ANY AND ALL RIGHTS 
TO NOTICE AND TO A JUDICIAL HEARING WITH RESPECT TO THE 
REPOSSESSION OP THE VEHICLES BY LESSOR IN THE EVENT OF A DEFAULT 
HEREUNDER BY LESSEE. 
19. TERMINATION. 
At tho end of tho Base Lease Term of any vehicle or upon tho termination of the loaso 
pursuant to Soction i t hereof by Lessor, or upon tho oxorciso by Lessee of its right to retire 
any vehicle from service pursuant to Soction 3.3, Lessee will return such vehicle to Lessor 
at the location specified in Soction 3.3. Lessor will soil it at wholesale in a commercially 
reasonable manner. If tho not soiling price is moro than tho amount (tho "Termination 
Value" with respect to such vehicle) determined by applying tho formula sot forth in Exhibit 
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"T HI a formula tor such determination spptars thtrtin or by multiplying tht (actor sot 
forth in EdUMtT by pm Agreed Price, (ii a tablt of factors for such determination appears 
therein), M ^ v U I pay Lessee the surplus less any amounts owed under this Agreement. If 
it is teegj^H will pay. the deficiency plus any amounts owed under this Agreement* The 
net sefifflVWfet is the sale price less the sum o! (a) Lessor's direct expenses of selling, 
preparing and storing such vehicle and (b) the Settlement Pee shown on Schedule "A". 
20. FURTHER ASSURANCES 
Lessee shall execute and deliver to Lessor, upon Lessor's request, such instruments, 
opinions of counsel, authorizing resolutions, financing statements and assurances as Lessor 
deems necessary for the confirmation or perfection of this Agreement and Lessor's rights 
hereunder. In furtherance thereof, Lessor may file or record this Agreement or financing 
statements with respect thereto so as to give notice to any interested parties* Any such 
filing or recording shall not be deemed evidence that this Agreement is intended as security 
or of any intent to create a security interest under the Uniform Commercial Code* Lessee 
authorizes Lessor and Lessor's assignee and each subsequent assignee to file a financing 
statement signed only by Lessor or such assignee in all places where such authorization is 
permitted by law. 
21. SEVERABILITY. 
Any provision of this Agreement that is prohibited or unenforceable in any jurisdiction 
shallt as to such jurisdiction, be ineffective to the extent of such prohibition and 
unenforceability without invalidating the remaining provision hereof. To the extent 
permitted by applicable law, Lessee hereby waives any provision of law which prohibiu or 
renders unenforceable any provisions hereof in any respect. 
22. NOTICES. 
All notices, reports and other documents provided for herein shall be deemed to have 
been given or made when mailed, postage prepaid, or delivered to a telegraph or cable 
company, addressed to Lessor or Lessee at their respective addresses set forth above or such 
other addresses as either of the parties hereto may designate in writing to the other from 
time to time for such purpose. 
23. AMENDMENTS AND WAIVERS. 
This Agreement, the Accounting Forms, Purchase Orders and Schedules executed by 
Lessor and Lessee constitute the entire agreement between Lessor and Lessee with respect 
to the vehicles and the subject matter of this Agreement. No term or provision of this 
Agreement, the Accounting Forms, Purchase Orders and Schedules may be changed, waived 
amended or terminated except by a written agreement signed by both Lessor and Lessee 
except that Leseor may insert the serial number of any vehicle or other identify inj 
information on the appropriate documents after delivery of such vehicle. No express o 
implied waiver by Leseor of any Event of Default hereunder shall in any way be, or b 
construed to b% a waiver of any future or subsequent Event of Default, whether similar i 
kind or otherwise/ 
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2%. Qtftfl<yi-AV) CONSTRUCTION. 
T S n O t t E M e M T SHALL BE BINOING, WHEN ACCEPTEO bY LESSOR IN THE 
COMMONWEALTH Olf PENNSYLVANIA, AND SHALL BE CONSTRUED AND ENFORCED 
IN ACCORDANCE WITH AND GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OP THE COMMONWEALTH OF 
PENNSYLVANIA. LESSEE CONSENTS TO THE EXERCISE OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
OVER LESSEE BY ANY COURT OF RECORD SITTING IN PENNSYLVANIA IN 
CONNECTION WITH ANY ACTION ARISING OUT Of THIS AGREEMENT, AND WAIVES 
ALL OBJECTIONS TO VENUE IN ANY SUCH COURT ANO TO SERVICE OF PROCESS ON 
LESSEE AT ITS DESIGNATED AOORESS FOR PURPOSES OF NOTICE HEREUNDER IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH THE PENNSYLVANIA UNIFORM INTERSTATE ANO 
INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE ACT OR ANY SUCCESSOR STATUTE IN CONNECTION 
WITH SUCH ACTION. Lessee wuvo , insofar as permitted by law, trial by jury and right of 
counterclaim in any action bttw««n the parties. The titles o! the sections of this 
Agreement are for convenience only and shall not define or limit any of the terms or 
provisions hereof. Time is of the essence of this Agreement in each and all of its provisions. 
25. PARTIES. 
The provisions of this Agreement shall be binding upon* and inure to the benefit of, the 
permitted assigns, representatives and successors of the Lessor and Lessee. If there is more 
than one Lessee named in this Agreement, the liability of each shall be joint and several. 
26. FINANCIAL STATEMENTS. 
Lessee will furnish Lessor (a) within W days of the close) oi each fiscal quarter of 
Lessee a balance sheet and profit and loss statement of Lessee as of the end of such quarter, 
(b) within 90 days after the close of each fiscal year of Lessee, a balance sheet and profit 
and loss statement of lessee as of the end of such year, the yearly statement to be certified 
by public accountants of recognized standing acceptable to Lessor, (c) such other financial 
sutements and information to be furnished promptly after the same is made available to 
said stockholders, and (d) such other information respecting the financial condition and 
operations of Lessee as Lessor may from time to time reasonably respect. 
27. CONFESSION OP JUDGMENT. 
UPON DEFAULT LESSEE HEREBY EMPOWERS THE PROTHONOTARY OR ANY 
ATTORNEY OP ANY COURT OF RECORD WITHIN THE UNITED STATES OR ELSEWHERE 
TO APPEAR FOR IT AND, WITH OR WITHOUT ONE OR MORE DECLARATIONS FILED, 
CONFESS A JUDGMENT Oil JUDGMENTS AGAINST IT IN THE FAVOR OF LESSOR OR 
ANY ASSIGNEE AS OP ANY TERM FOR THE UNPAID BALANCE HEREOF WITH COSTS 
OF SUIT AND AN ATTORNEY'S COMMISSION OF 10% FOR COLLECTION, WITH 
RELEASE OF ALL ERRORS ANO WITHOUT STAY OF EXECUTION, AND INQUISITION 
AND EXTENSION UPON ANY LEVY ON REAL ESTATE IS HEREBY WAIVED AND 
CONDEMNATION AGREED TO, AND THE EXEMPTION OP ALL PROPERTY FROM LEVY 
ANO SALE ON ANY EXECUTION THEREON, ANO EXEMPTION OF WAGES FROM 
ATTACHMENT, ARE ALSO HEREBY EXPRESSLY WAIVED, ANO NO BENEFIT 
EXEMPTION SHALL BE CLAIMED UNDER OR BY VIRTUE OP ANY EXEMPTION LAW 
NOW IN FORCE OR WHICH MAY HEREAFTER BE ENACTED. 
-13-
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 B N W Y A«NO.LE0CED THAT T H E ^ C O W U E W . * JU^MENT 
«Ov'5«5» « * « • ^ ^ U N o l M A^ VOLUNTAWLY ACREEO TO EY 
S S U I L -HOWLEOCES RECE.PT OP AH EXECUTED A*0 TRUE COPY 
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caused these presen MCQASBA^RICAN 
LCa5CEtjrnrf*y^^^T- CAR RENTAL, 
WITNESS* 
Accept* by L M N T tMt 
Pittsburgh, PA 1523*. 
sP-9
 t 1 9 ^ *t 121 Freeport Road, 
TERMINAL RENTAL ADJUSTMENT CLAUSE 
LR.C 14*0X13) Statement 
The undersigned hereby certifies, under penalty of perjury, that it intends that more 
than 30 percent ot the use ol the vehicles subject to the above Agreement will be in the 
undersigned** trade or business* 
The undersigned has further been advised that it will not be treated as the owner of 
the vehicles subject to the Agreement for federal income tax purposes and the undersigned 
is not aware of any information which may lead Lessor to believe that this certification is 
false* iJ**** 
LESSEE*l*rmipftyfoAi. CAR RZNTA 
Dates. 
. ! * > -
SCHDOLI "A" 
TO PRimixD vraicu LIASI AcnMrr 
NOI-TAI OKIIITIO 
ACQUISITIOR FBI 
$73.00 
SSTTUMBIIT Fit 
$75.00 por vehicle on vehicles told by LHV on behalf of MCO, Inc. 
DBA/Aserlean International Car Rental. 
AFPOKIOnSIT OF EXCESS OF SALES OR SETTLEMENT PRICE IH EXCESS OF BOOK 
VALUE AFTER DEDUCTION OF SETTLEMENT Fit. 
Laaaor shall pay to Lessee aa a ramtal edjustseat 1001 of any such 
excess. If tha asount resaining taamlta is a deficiency, Laaaaa shall 
pay to Laaaor aa rental adjustsent tha asount of soak deficiency* 
providad that Lassor shall guarantee to Laaaaa sinlsns nat rasala 
procaada equal to 20X of tha Agreed Prica at tha beginning of tha initial 
laaaa tars. If Laaaaa is otherwise persltted to and doaa alact to extend 
tha laasa of any vehicle beyond tha Baaa Laaaa Tarn, Lassor shall 
guarantaa 231 of tha fair value of tha vehicle at tha lacaptlon of tha 
txtansion period. 
"Fair valua19 shall ba daflnad as 831 of raaala value for 
autosobilee, and 70% of rasala valua on light trucks aa raportad by 
"Automotive Markat Raport,v published by Autosotive Auction Publishing, 
Inc., aa of tha publication data immediately pracading tha laat day of 
tha south which lssadlataly pracadas tha sonth in which tarsinatlon aa to 
tha particular vahlcla occurs. 
Sattlasanta of exceee or deficiency fro* raaala, aa daacrlbad 
above, shall ba based on calendar-yeer-to-date sales. Tentative 
sattlasanta will ba sada sonthly, but adjuated quarterly, to year-to-date 
reaults. For this purpoe*, a quarter la daflnad aa a threa-sonth period 
ending March 31, June 30, Septesber 30 and Decesber 31. 
FIIAICXW C1ARC1 
Financing charge a shall ba charged at an lntaraet rata of two 
flMHPfMRF la excess of tha prise rata. Tha prise rata shall ba that 
rats chafrftd by Citibank, Haw Tork. This rata will ba changed every sonth 
by reference to tha prise rata aa raportad by Citibank, New Tork on tha 
13th calendar day of tha applicable laaaa period* 
ADMIHSTRATIV1 F B 
•0011 of tha Agreed Frice par sonth par vahlcla. After fortyeight 
souths, tha adslnlstrative fas shall ba 201 of tha Monthly Rental Faysant 
par sonth par vahlcla. 
Page 1 of 3 
6.AGREED P1ZCI 
$100.00 over Daalar Invoice. This pricing appllas only Co ordarad 
vahiclas customarily usad by corporata flaats which ara aanufactured by 
Bulck, Chevrolet, Chryslar, Dodge, Ford, Mareury, Oldsmoblle, Plymouth, 
Pontlae and Chavrolat, Dodga and Ford Trucks having a G W of 11,000 
pounds or under. This pricing is premised on continuation of tha vahicla 
manufacturers' existing pricing structura and daalar lncantlva programs 
for tha sala of motor vahiclaa to lta daalara for 1987 models. In tha 
event tha pricing structura or daalar lncantlva la changad by any of tha 
manufacturers for 1987 or subsequent aodals, then tha pricing agreed to 
herein shall ba null and void vlth respect to that manufacturer's vehicle 
and the partlaa hereto agree to negotiate revised pricing. 
If a motor vehicle is taken from tha existing inventory of a dealer 
or is ordered by LXV from a dealer spec if lad by Lessee, LMV shall ba 
entitled to a fee of 21 over procurement coat. 
7. METHOD OP COMPUTATION FOE RECTAL PATMEETS 
Each Monthly Rental Payment shall ba equal tot 
I. Tha Agraad Price leaa tha balloon Payment of aaeh vahicla divided 
by tha Base Laaaa Term aa aat forth in tha Accounting Form. 
PLUS 
II. Tha financing amount determined by multiplying tha financing charge 
by tha preceding month's book valua. 
8. IXSUSARCE 
In accordance vlth tha provisions of paragraph 11 of this 
Agreement, Laaaaa la to provide lnauranca aa follows* 
Compraheualve, fire, thaft and collision insurance for tha actual 
caat valua of tha equipment. Laaaaa aha 11 ba responsible for any 
dadactibia provision applicable to thia insurance. LmBB^m shall also 
pwrtda public liability insurance vlth minimum limits of $230,000 par 
paraom and $300,000 par accident for bodily Injury and $230,000 for 
property or a combined tingle limit in tha smount of $300,000. LOT 
Laaalng, Inc. shall ba named aa additional lnaurad and Loat Payee* 
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LUSI TEIM8 II MOUTHS 
Forty-tight (4*) moatha. Tht minimum ltaaa tars of any piaca of 
aqtffcpamt laaat haraundar it twaiva (12) moutha. Unless Ltator otherwise 
comaants, tht laaaa with rat pact to any piaca of equipment may not ba 
terminated by Lattta prior to tha and of tha tvalfth (12th) month of tha 
Baaa Lmm^m Tarm thereof. In tha event that Lattor to contantt and tha 
laata it to terminated by Lattta, Ltttaa agraaa that Lattor shall ba 
entitled, in addition to tha amount tpaclflad in Exhibit "I" hereto, to 
raatonabla administratis chargat attociatad with tuch termination 
Including any retldual value of tha vehicle and any penalties and charget 
Imposed by financial institution. 
IZTBMDD RMTAL 
Hot Available 
ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS 
Should any equipmant laaaad haraundar ba terminated or replaced 
prior to tha end of tha Baaa Laaaa Tarm for tha purpoaaa (directly or 
indirectly) of refinancing, Lattta agraaa to pay to Lattor all cottt and 
penaltitt attociatad with tuch premature termination or replacement, 
including, without limitation, any and all panaltiaa of financial 
inatitutlona, raatonabla administrative chargaa of Laaaor to effect tuch 
prematura termination or replacemant and any loaa of anticipated tax 
banaflta to Laator aa opacified in thia Agreemant. 
Upon occurrence of a dafault by Laataa, or guarantor(t), if any, at 
provided for undar thia Agreemant or undar tha terma of any other 
agreemant of 1%MB% antarad into betwaen Lettaa and Laaaor that hat been 
guarantaad by guarantor(t), if any, Laator at ita option thall hava and 
may axarclaa, with raepact to thia Agreemant or any othar agreemant or 
laaaa, any and all rightt and remedies available to Lattor undar tha 
terma of thia Agreamant or any othar agreemant or undar tha terma of 
thia Agreamant or amy othar agreamant or laata, at lam or in equity. 
Bxcapt aa otharwisa provided in paragraph 17 of thia Agreemant, a 
dafault undar tha terma of amy laaaa or agreement la, at Laator1t option, 
a dafault undar all laaaaa or ag^aamanta betwaan Lattor and Laaaaa and/or 
guarantor, if amy. 
BEOOl 
Laaaaa repreeantt and warrants that it haa not ratalnad a findar or 
a brokar lm connaction with thia Laaaa or tha trantactiont contemplated 
by thla~*ta*ea. Laaaor rapraaaata and warranta that it haa not ratalnad a 
fimdar or a brokar lm connection with thia Lm^Bm or tha tranaactiona 
contamplatad haraby othar than Ranta1 Car Laaalng and Services Inc., 
whoaa faa will ba paid by Laaaor alona. Laaaaa acknowltdgtt that nalthar 
Ramtal Car Laaalng and Servicee Inc., nor ita employeet or 
repraeantatlvae ara tha employaa, agant or rapretentativa of Lattor for 
amy purpoaaa whattoaver and haa not amd cannot make amy rapratantatlon, 
s testaments, promitet, claima or contract modlficatloma of any kind or tha 
lika on behalf of Laaaor. 
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coffTiranoi or ADDITIONAL PROFISIOWS 
13. Add a new section M2.4i Leeeee represents and vimati (a) that 
thla Leeee constitutes, and eech Schedule and attachment when executed 
will eonatltuta, A duly Authorised and valid obligation of Lattta, 
anforceeble Against Laaaaa in accordanca with tha tcrme thereof, (b) that 
neither tha execution by Laaaaa of thla Laaaa and aach Schadula nor ita 
performance tharaof will raault in any brtach of, or eonatltuta a dafault 
undar or a violation of Laaaaa'a cartiflcata of incorporation, Laaaaaft 
by-lawa or any othar governing instrument of Laaaaa, any lav, rule, or 
regulation or any agreement, order or Judgement, (c) that Leaaee it in 
good atandlng in ita atate of incorporation art* other form of organization 
and la entitled to own propertiea and to carry on buaineaa in each atate 
where any vehicle la to be located, (d) that no conaent, 1 ling or othar 
action by or with Any governmentel Agency or other regulatory body it 
neceaaary for the acquisition and operation of tha vahlclea aa 
contemplated by thla Leaae, (e) that there la no litigation pending or 
threatened agalnat ita obllgatlone hereunder and (f) that all financial 
•tatementa furniahed by Leaaee to Leaaor fairly preaent the financial 
condition and reaulta of operatlona of Leaaee aa of the reapectlve dates 
and for the reapectlve perioda covered and do not contain any untrue 
statement, or any omission, of a material fact, and that aince the date 
of the moat recent of auch financial statementa, there haa occurred no 
material adverse change in the bualnaee or condition of Lessee. Leaaee'a 
execution of each Schadula ahall eonatltuta a reaffirmation of thaaa 
repreaentatlona and warrantlea. Leaaee ahall provide Leaaor an opinion 
of couueel, acceptable to Leaaor and ita counael, that itema 2.4(a) 
through (a) are correct aa represented. 
14. On page 7, paragraph 12. GENERAL INDEMNITT inaert on line 3 after 
"in part19 tha following! "arising out of activltlee permitted hereunder 
and/or (b) related". 
15. Modificationa for paragraph 10.2 and 13.1. "The above paragrapha 
notwithatending, Leeeee may rent vehiclee provided undar thla Leaae for 
perioda of time, not to exceed the term of tha vehicle under thla Leaae, 
to licenaed drivara over 21 yeara of age and otherwiae qualifying 
hereunder. Thla right to rent la expreaaly limited to rentala in the 
normal courae of Leaaee'a bualnaee undar reetrlctlona contained in the 
Exhibit "Aw - MCO, Inc. Standard Form Agreement. 
16. Ad4 to paragraph 17.6 at tha end, after "defaulta" the following 
aa part of tha leat sentence, "Leaaee ahall fa -1 to rent any vehicle in 
eccordamce with tha tarma of Exhibit "A* or any raetrlctlone of thla 
17. DEPOSIT. Leaaor haa tha right to demand Leaaee make and maintain a 
depoelt with Leaaor equal to tha laat preceding monthly rental at any 
given point in time. Failure by Laeaaa to maintain auch a depoelt amount 
with Leaaor, upon Leaaor1s demand, shall be a breech of thle Agreement by 
Leeeee and shall eonatltuta a full Ivent of Default with all the 
couaequencce thereof. 
THIS SCHDUU "A" 13 A* ADDENDUM TO THE ABOVE REFERENCED PREFERRED VEHICLE 
LEASE AGREEMENT WITH CAPITAL 12XD TERMS USED III THIS ADDENDUM AMD NOT OTHBRVISI 
DlflHD D u l l HAVING THE RESPECTIVE MEANINGS AS SPECIFIED IN TBI AGREEMENT. 
THIS SCHEDULE IS INCORPORATED INTO AND CONSTITUTES AN INTEGRAL PART OF TH] 
ABOVI REFERENCED AGREEMENT. 
Thii Schedule "A" le pert of the Preferred Vehicle Lease 
Agreement dated December 29, 1986 between the parties and it 
hereby aade a part thereof. 
LMV LEASING, INC., LESSOR 
* * * * * * * * * * i '•• • i 
Tltlii 
x*c 
MCq^DBA/ 
AMEKICAH I 
JIAL CA1 IIHTAL, LIS 8KB 
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0HCOHDITIOMI AMD IlIIfOCABLS 
CDAtAWTT OP fATHUT 
EXHIBIT G 
It ceotldtratleo of tho too of Too Dollars ($10*00) aod 
othor §0*4 ••< voloohla eooelderetlooe9 tho rocolpt ood 
aeffleteeey of which lo hereby acknowledged, and for tho 
porpooo of ooohtog to loduce LN? Loaalog» Xae« CLeeeor*) to 
ootor toto o looolog arreegeaeot with 
MCO, INC, DBA/AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL CAR RENTAL 
("Leaaee*), tho Uoderelgeed, jolotly aod eeverailj if oort than 
ooo9 doeo hereby Irrevocably ood eocoodltloeelly guarantee to 
Loaaor9 ood to ita traoaforota9 aucctaaore, aod eeelgoe tho 
proapt peyecot ood perforoence of all anot ood othor 
ohllgotlooo vbleh aro duo or horooftor oey bocooo due aod tho 
porformaaea ood obeerveoce by Leoeee of oil of tho taroat 
coodltloue (loeludlog thoao portalolog to laaoraoca liability), 
atlpolatlooo ood ogreeaeote poraoaot to that cartalo laaao 
egreeaeot betweeo Loaaor and Loaaoo dated Decaaber 29 . lfg 7 
("Leeee~)9 loeludlog toy aod oil rcotwale, eodlflcatlooa, 
aaeedaeote or ostooolooa9 lo whole or lo part, oado with 
roopoct thereto* 
•o act, eourao of deeliog, dalay, or oolaaloo oo tho part 
of Loaaor lo oaorelalog or ooforclog ooy of Ito righto or 
rooadlaa oodor tho Laaao or oodor thlo loetroaeet cieeotcd lo 
cooooetloo with tho Leeee (including tho roloooo of ooy 
goereotor of tho Loaao) aholl lopair or ho prajodlclal to tho 
righto aod reaedlee of Loaaor horooodor aod tho ooforeoooot 
hereof* Loaaor say eiteod, oodlfy, or pootpooo tho tioo aod 
aeooer of peyaeot aod perforaeoce of tho terae, coodltlooa, 
atlpolatlooo aod egreeseote of tho Loaaa ood ooy othor docoooot 
or lootroaoot lo cooooetloo thorawlth, all without ootleo to or 
eooooot by tho Uoderelgeed* Loaaor ooy ooforeo tho provleloee 
horoof froa tlao to tlao oo oftoo oo tho oeeooloo therefore ooy 
rorloe ood Loaaor oholl oot bo required to flrot initiate, 
purooo or exerclee ooy of Ito righto or reaedloo ogoloot ooy 
othor pereoo or porty primarily or ooeoodorlly liable oodor tho 
Loooo* 
Tho Ooderaigned ogreeo that thia laetruaeot aholl bo 
governed by tho lawo of tho State of Peooeylveole and the 
Underelgoed hereby eoooooto to tho jurladlctloo of tho courta 
of tho Itato of Feeeoylvanla aod to bolog owed therein. 
XI VITlIgg UIIIIOP, the Ooderaigned bee eaoeoted ood 
dellvote* Ihlo lootroaoot uoder eeol thlo <Z£ doy of 
1M7 * 
Signed, e e e U d \ o d delivered 
la tho prodbofo/oft 
UHCOHDITtOIUl AR9 IUI?OCAIU 
COAIAUTT Of FAYMIHT EXHIBIT H 
U aoaol4orattoa of tho 100 of Too Dollart ($ 10.00) ao4 
othor gao4 aa4 waluablo coii8l4aratloaa9 tho racatpt aa4 
auffiaiaaoy of which lo haraby ackaowlt4go49 ao4 for tho 
purpooo of aooklag to la4uca LMf Laaalng, lot. CLaaaor*) to 
ootor into 0 looolog arraogaaaat with 
MCO, INC. DBA /AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL CAR RENTAL 
(#liMtt#), tho 0a4aralgaa49 jototly aa4 aovorally If ooro ehoo 
*oo9 dots horaby lrravocably aa4 aaaoa41ttoaally guaraataa to 
Laaaor9 aa4 to lto traaafaraaa9 aaccaaaora9 aa4 ootlfoo tho 
proapt payaaot aa4 porforaaaca of ail auao aa4 othor 
obllgatloaa which ara 4ua or horooftor oar bacoao 4uo aa4 tho 
porforaaaca aa4 obaarraaca by Laaaao of oil of tho taraa9 
coa41tlooa (laclu41ag thoao partalalag to laaoraaca liability), 
atlpulatlooo an4 agraaaaata poraaaat to that cartala laaao 
agraaaaot bctvoco Loaaor ao4 Laaaao 4ata4 Dacaabar 29 . lit 6 
("Laaao")9 lacla41ag aay aa4 all raaawala, ao41fIcatioaa, 
aaaadaaata or oatoaaloaa9 la wholo or la part, aa4o with 
raapoac thorato. 
10 aet9 courao of 4aallag, 4alay9 or oolaaloa oa tho port 
of Loooor la oiorelalag or oaforolag aay of lto righto or 
roao41oo aa4or tho Loaao or oo4or thlo laatraaoac oaoeato4 la 
eoaaoetloa with tha Loaao (tacl*41ag tha roloaao of oaf 
goaraator of tho Loaao) ahall lapalr or ha praju41clal to tha 
rlghta aa4 raao41oa of Loaaor horoaa4ar aa4 tha aaforcoaoat 
horoof. Loaaor aay aitaa49 ao41fy9 or poatpoao tho tlaa aa4 
aaaaar of payaoat aa4 parforaoaca of tho torao9 eoa41tloao9 
atlpalatloao aa4 agraaaaata of tha Laaaa ao4 aay othor 4ocuaoat 
or laatruaaat lo coaooctloa therewith, all without aotlco to or 
eoaaoat by tho 0a4eralgae4» Laaaar aay aaforeo tho prowlaloaa 
haraof froa tlaa to tlaa 00 oftoa ao tho oceaaloa tharaforo aay 
rarlaa aa4 Laaaor ohall aoc bo ra*alra4 to flrat loitlata, 
pureua or osoreloa aay af lta rlghta or roao41oo agalaat aay 
othor porooa or party prlaarlly or ooooo4arlly llablo *a4er tha 
Laaaa* 
Tho 0a4arolgao4 agraoo that thla laecruaeat ahall ba 
goworao4 by tha lava of tho Stato of Foaaaylwaala ao4 tha 
Ua4eralgae4 haroby oaaoooto to tha jarla41ctloa of tho courta 
of tha ftata af Faaaaylwaala aa4 ta balag aaa4 therela* 
11 VITIIgS VIIItOF, tha 9a4aralgae4 ba^eiecute4 aa4 
4allwara4 thla laatruaaat oa4ar aaal thla /l*2? 4ar of 
AajU^p. IM7 . 
Slgoo49 aoolo4 ao4 4ellvcrc4 
la tho proaooco of: 
L/WVLEASING, INC. 
A XCRQX ti/VANtm SERVlQtS C 0 ' . ' c - \ ' 
Notice of Sale 
(This Notice is for informational 
purposes only as to MCO, Inc., 
which is currently in a Chapter 11 
Bankruptcy Proceeding) 
To: MCO, Inc., d/b/a/American 
International Rent-A-Car 
1380 North West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
Mr. Roy W, Mallory 
2980 Apache Way 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Mr. and Mrs. Val Conhn 
2214Temple View Circle 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Mr. and Mrs. Tubber T. Okuda 
1994 South 1175 East 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Pursuant to Section 18 of the Preferred Vehicle Lease Agreement ("Lease") 
entered into between LMV LEASING, INC. ("Lessor") and MCO, Inc., d/b/a American 
International Car Rental on December 29, 1986, NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that 
based the Lessee's default under the Lease, the Lessor will sell, as provided herein, 
the vehicles listed on Schedule "A", attached hereto, with the proceeds from such 
sale to be applied first to the costs of preparing the vehicles for sale, costs of sale, 
and storage fees with any remaining proceeds to be credited toward the amount 
owing Lessor by Lessee based on Lessee's default under the Lease. 
Said vehicles will be sold after April 13, 1988, for the highest and best price in an 
"AS IS" condition. Said vehicles are currently and will continue to be located, at the 
time of said sale, at Nate Wade Subaru, 1207 South Mam Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
and will bt sold in the same manner and fashion as other used vehicles located at 
Nate Wad* Subaru. 
DATED this 4th day of April , 1988. 
LMV LEASING, INC 
By 
tdwara i. Mccracken 
Title Contoller 
EXHIBIT J 
E. BARNEY GESAS #1179 
BRETT F. WOOD #4943 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-3300 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
FILED 
ri*!7r",.T COURT 
, i Jw 
,,..;cr 
j 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
awmttA 
LMV LEASING, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROY W. MALLORY, VAL CONLIN, 
BARBARA CONLIN, TUBBER T. 
OKUDA, and MARY Y. OKUDA, 
Defendants. 
FINAL JUDGMENT 
Civil No, C88-2136 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
The Court, having previously ruled on LMV Leasing, Inc.'s 
("LMV") Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Liability, 
and having found Defendants Val Conlin, Barbara Conlin ("Defen-
dants Conlin"), Tubber T., Okuda and Mary Y. Okuda ("Defendants 
Okuda") to be personally liable to LMV based on their personal 
guarantys, and having determined that the only remaining issue in 
this case is the amount of damages incurred by LMV, and having 
requested and received Affidavits from LMV, Defendants Conlin and 
Defendants Okuda as to the damages incurred by LMV, and in 
conjunction with the previous ruling that LMV is entitled to 
judgment against Defendants Conlin and Defendants Okuda, the Court 
nnnr\\/\_ 
hereby makes the following findings of facts, pursuant to Rule 52, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as grounds for its decision: 
1. On December 29, 1986, MCO entered into a Preferred 
Vehicle Lease Agreement ("Lease") with LMV, pursuant to which LMV 
leased to MCO fourteen (14) motor vehicles ("Motor Vehicles") for 
forty-eight (48) month terms commencing on various dates. 
2. On January 26, 1987, Defendants Conlin, in their personal 
capacities, executed an Unconditional Irrevocable and Personal 
Guaranty ("Conlin Guaranty"), wherein they agreed to be jointly, 
severally, and personally liable for all amounts owed to LMV by 
MCO under the Lease, including any damages LMV may suffer due to 
any breach of the Lease by MCO. 
3. On February 11, 1987, Defendants Okuda, in their 
individual capacities, executed an Unconditional Irrevocable and 
Personal Guaranty ("Okuda Guaranty"), wherein they agreed to be 
jointly, severally, and personally liable for all amounts owed to 
LMV by MCO under the Lease, including any damages LMV may suffer 
due to> any breach of the Lease by MCO. 
4. Pursuant to section 4 of the Lease, MCO agreed to make 
monthly lease payments to LMV as rent for each Motor Vehicle. All 
lease payments were due on the 15th day of each month and would 
be assessed a late charge equal to the amount of two percent (2%) 
per month of the rental payment amount past due. 
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5. The amount of the monthly lease payments due from MCO to 
LMV under the Lease is calculated on the basis of an "Agreed 
Price" as defined in Schedule A of the Lease, plus a financing 
charge, a minimal administrative fee, and a late charge, if 
applicable, 
6. In compliance with the Lease, LMV delivered to MCO 
fourteen (14) Motor Vehicles selected by LMV, 
7. Although invoices were submitted to MCO by LMV on a 
monthly basis, MCO failed to make lease payments under the Lease 
due in April, May, June, and August, 1987, in a timely manner and 
late charges were assessed to MCO for those months' late payments. 
8. MCO has failed to make the monthly lease payments under 
the Lease since July 15, 1987, and is therefore in default under 
the Lease. 
9. MCO made only a partial payment of $2,587.36 toward the 
total monthly lease payment due on April 15, 1987, of $3,384.80, 
leaving a balance of $797.44 owing by MCO on April's lease 
payment. MCO was also assessed an additional late fee in July, 
1987, for failure to pay LMV the remaining amount due on the April 
15, 1987, lease payment. 
10. On August 13, 1987, MCO filed a petition for relief with 
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah under 
Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. 
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11. Section 7 of the Lease requires that MCO pay for the 
titling, registration, licenses and inspection of the Motor 
Vehicles. 
12. In the event of default, the Lease provides that LMV may 
declare all unpaid future lease payments immediately due and 
payable. This accelerated amount is calculated by determining the 
future lease payments due on all vehicles leased to MCO and then 
discounting that amount to its present value at a discount rate 
of six percent (6%). 
13. The Lease further provides that LMV may recover as 
"liquidated damages" an amount equal to the sum of all unpaid 
lease payments to date, the total late charges to date, all 
administrative expenses, all attorney's fees and court costs, plus 
the accelerated amount of all future unpaid lease payments 
discounted to their present value, less the proceeds from the sale 
of the Motor Vehicles. 
14. Section 18 of the Lease also provides that LMV may 
recover all expenses it has incurred or will incur, including all 
attorney's fees, legal expenses and court costs, in exercising 
its remedies and protecting its rights under the terms of the 
Lease. 
15. Section 18.1(f) of the Lease provides that upon default 
by MCO, LMV may "sell or lease the vehicles at a public auction 
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16• Defendants Conlin and Defendants Okuda were given and 
received notice that MCO was in default under the terms of the 
Lease with LMV and that as personal guarantors they were personal-
ly liable for MCCVs performance under the Lease. 
17. Defendants Conlin and Defendants Okuda did not respond 
to this Notice of Default. . 
18. After MCO defaulted under the Lease and LMV obtained the 
Motor Vehicles from MCO, a Notice of Sale ("Notice") was sent to 
each of the defendants and MCO. This Notice stated that LMV would 
sell the Motor Vehicles, pursuant to the terms of the Lease, after 
April 13, 1988, what the terms of the sale would be, and that the 
Motor Vehicles were located at a certain used car lot. This 
Notice also stated that the Motor Vehicles would be sold in the 
same manner and fashion as other used vehicles located on that 
used car lot. 
19. The Motor Vehicles were sold within a one (1) month time 
period beginning on or about May 10, 1988, and ending on or about 
June 10, 1988. The net proceeds from the sale totalled $80,100.00 
which is approximately 99% of the Motor Vehicles' wholesale 
values. 
20. Defendants Conlin and Defendants Okuda have made 
payments to LMV at any time. 
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21. The total amount due to LMV from MCO for all late 
charges, unpaid lease payments, administrative fees, and accelera-
ted amounts, less the proceeds from the sale of the vehicles, is 
$44,145.79. However, the Court determined that damages should not 
be based on the formula provided in the Lease but rather on the 
unamortized balance of the lease payments owed, plus all unpaid 
and accrued monthly lease payments, late charges, and administra-
tive fees, less the net sale proceeds from the Motor Vehicles. 
22. On March 20, 1989, the Court granted LMVfs Motion for 
Summary Judgment establishing Defendants Conlin and Defendants 
Okudas' unconditional and irrevocable, joint, several, and 
personal liability under their respective guarantys. 
23. Pursuant to the Lease, MCO could have terminated the 
Lease* with LMV at any time by providing written notice to LMV of 
such termination and surrendering the Motor Vehicles. 
24. Under the Lease, MCO had to return any and all of the 
Motor Vehicles then remaining in its possession at the end of the 
Lease and MCO did not have the option to extend the life of the 
Lease. 
25. Pursuant to the Lease, no refundable deposit was required 
by LMV from MCO at the inception of the Lease. 
26. The term of the Lease is less than the economic life of 
the Motor Vehicles. 
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Based upon the above findings, the Court concludes as a matter 
of law as follows: 
The Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants Conlin and 
Defendants Okuda and has subject matter jurisdiction over this 
case. This case involves a lease and not a sale subject to a 
security interest. The Conlin Guaranty and the Okuda Guaranty are 
unconditional guarantys of payment which, upon the default of MCO, 
fixed the liability of Defendants Conlin and Defendants Okuda at 
the amount owed by MCO. LMV was free to proceed against the 
guarantors at that point without exhausting collection efforts 
against MCO. 
LMV acted in a commercially reasonable manner when it 
repossessed the Motor Vehicles and sold them on a used car lot 
through a private sale. This method of sale produced a greater 
amount of sale proceeds upon the sale of the Motor Vehicles than 
would have been produced by selling them at an auction to a used 
car dealer at substantially lower prices. 
When MCO was in default under the Lease, LMV had the right 
under the Lease to accelerate the remaining lease payments and 
seek to collect all those, as well as all past amounts due under 
the Lease, from the guarantors. 
The Motion to Strike Affidavit for Attorneys' Fees filed by 
Defendants Conlin and Defendants Okuda is denied. Said affidavit 
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substantially complies with the rules set forth in the Utah Code 
of Judicial Administration. 
Accordingly, judgment will be entered against Defendants 
Conlin and Defendants Okuda, jointly and severally, for 
$50,500.00, which includes damages in the amount of $37,000.00, 
plus interest thereon at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum 
compounded annually until paid, together with attorney's fees of 
$13,500.00. The Judgment granted herein is final pursuant to Rule 
54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Clerk is expressly 
directed to enter the Judgment as final. 
DATED this W day of //V/$^y , 1989. 
BY Tfe COURT} 
HONORABLE PAT B. BRIAN 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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